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The suspension of Zimbabwe from the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) in 2001 has been justified as resulting from loan repayment arrears and failed 
macroeconomic policies. This dissertation argues that these justifications oversimplify the 
relationship between the Fund and Zimbabwe in the 2000s. As such, three factors are 
essential for a more comprehensive analysis into the country’s foreign policy- the state type, 
the impact of bargaining between factions of different ideological underpinnings 
(internationalists vs. nationalists), and land reform. The socio-economic context of neo-
colonialism and the negative impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP) on the domestic level, and comprehensive economic sanctions on the international 
sphere forged a radicalised state. The Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) 
became the conduit through which economic redistribution occurred and the structural 
cleavages it created were significant in defining the political ‘rules of the game’. We argue 
that foreign policy analysis of a radicalised state specifically necessitates a closer look at the 
symbiotic synergies between domestic bargaining and international negotiation. Through the 
lens of Putnam’s Two Level games hypothesis, we conclude that there were four main factors 
that determined the country’s foreign policy towards the IMF and the failure of the 
negotiations- there was a prioritisation of domestic political considerations over external 
conditionalities; there was an incompatibility of ‘win-sets’ between the IMF and Zimbabwe; 
that comprehensive sanctions reduced the IMF’s bargaining space; and domestic ideological 
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1) Background statement and Motivations of study 
 
In 2000 the Zimbabwean government launched into a massive and controversial ‘fast track’ 
Land Reform and Resettlement Programme1 (LRRP), which aimed at redistributing and 
correcting land imbalances which had been a ubiquitous feature of post-colonial Zimbabwe. 
According to official estimates, a total of 11 million hectares, including the best arable land, 
were transferred from about 4,000 mostly large-scale white commercial farmers to about 
300,000 small indigenous farmers2
This programme presented a fait accompli for countries in the region. For close to a decade 
subsequent to the LRRP, the socio-political, economic and foreign policy priorities of the 
Zimbabwean government, civil society elements and the business community in the country 
and region either adapted, were reformulated or changed entirely. Of significance was the 
supposed irrationality of LRRP’s manner of execution, the ‘mismanagement’ of the economic 
free-fall that followed: Thabo Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ manner of engagement and the 
rhetorical stand-off between the Zimbabwe and Western powers (most notably the USA and 
Britain). The politics of land reform has always been highly political in Zimbabwe and the 
2000s served to highlight the extent to which it has shaped both political and economic policy 
(both domestic and foreign). After the liberation war of the late 1970s, the LRRP presented, 
without a doubt, a significant watershed in the political culture of the country. 
. This was the largest, and most controversial, property 
transfer in Zimbabwe's post-independence history. 
Although much literature has attempted to explain the LRRP, its manner of execution and its 
impact on the domestic political landscape in the country,3
                                                            
1 This LRRP (2) was the second phase of consolidated land redistribution since independence, the First Phase 
being from 1980-1989. 
 very few have looked at the way 
in which it shaped the content and substance of the country’s foreign policy. In any analysis 
2 Sachikonye, L. 2003. From ‘Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast Track’ Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question, in Review 
of African Political Economy. Volume 30, No. 6. (War and the Forgotten Continent) June 2003. Pp. 227 
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of a state’s foreign policy, it remains significant to investigate the domestic political, 
economic and social factors, and their effect on a particular foreign policy. The controversial 
Land Reform and Resettlement Program (LRRP) that was undertaken by the Zimbabwean 
government has stimulated a multitude of commentary and analysis. What has been markedly 
absent in the literature is a meaningful analysis into the effects that the LRRP had on the 
content and substance of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. In other words, if foreign policy is a 
reflection of domestic policies,4  how did the government justify, explain and project the 
ideas behind its ‘radicalisation’? That domestic politics and international relations are 
intermingled and that both affect each the other is hardly disputable. The agrarian reform had 
a lasting effect not only on the domestic political economy of the country, but also flavoured 
its relations to other states. To illustrate, it resulted in soured relations with many western 
countries (most notably the United States, Britain and Australia) and with the International 
Financial Institutions of the IMF and the World Bank. Zimbabwe removed itself from the 
Commonwealth, was suspended by the IMF and became the target of an international 
sanctions regime5
The interest of this project is not an exclusive evaluation of the LRRP as a phenomenon. 
Rather it will detail how ‘fast-track’ land reform changed the domestic politics of the country, 
that is,- reshaped the rules of the game within which various political and interest groups 
competed; and more specifically, the manner in which these changes affected the country’s 
foreign policy objectives and interactions with the international community. These changes 
relate specifically to the fault-lines that resulted between two domestic factions- those we 
term the ‘internationalists’ and the ‘nationalists’, and the way their competition translated 
onto the international political playing field. 
. It therefore remains significant to analyse how foreign policy changed 
since the commencement of the LRRP. We therefore argue that the best approach to 
understanding the seemingly contradictory international diplomatic stances of Zimbabwe 
between 2000 and 2007 towards the West in general and the IMF in particular are best 
analysed through the lens of Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Games theory. 
                                                            
4 See- Stavridis, S. and Hill, C. 1996. The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West European Reactions to the 
Falklands Conflict. Berg Publishers. Oxford. 
 
5 These comprised of targeted travel bans for individuals in the government, but most significantly was the 
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Condemnation and praise for the land reform was swift from many corners of the 
international community. Within these choruses there emerged a clear divergence of opinion. 
Much of the condemnation emanated from the Western developed countries and the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the vanguard of which was the United States and 
Britain. Their main critiques were premised on the lack of respect for the rule of law, 
property rights, what they considered to be the undermining of human rights and the 
defaulting of loan repayments. However, many countries in the developing world stood in 
solidarity with the Zimbabwean government and it’s LRRP. In particular, many African 
countries (particularly those in SADC) saw the land reform in Zimbabwe as justified and 
necessary.6
The rationale and implementation of the LRRP necessarily has to be contextualised within 
the rubric of two fundamental issues. First is the domestic political unrest and pressure which 
the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) increasingly found itself under 
with the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), various 
civil society elements (such as the National Constitutional Assembly for example) and 
growing disenfranchisement of the liberation war veterans. The second has an international 
dimension, particularly the influence of the IFI’s and the negative effects of their Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were implemented in the 1990s. An analysis into the 
transformation of relations between this national-international dichotomy necessarily has to 
remain cognisant of the socio-political and economic dynamics in both spheres. As will be 
argued later in the dissertation, domestic pressures and deteriorating relations with 
international actors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to the creation of a 
Zimbabwean situation that Moyo and Yeros (2007) term an ‘interrupted revolution marked 
by a radical agrarian reform and a radicalised state’.
 Many developing countries thus premised their support (and in some cases lack 
of condemnation) of the LRRP on principles of non-interference, Pan-African solidarity, anti 
neo-colonial rhetoric and through the recognition that land disparities, directly resulting from 
colonisation, in many of their countries remained an issue that required resolution. Some 
semi-developed countries also voiced their support, most significant of these being China.  
7
                                                            
6 As will be detailed later, this was particularly because of the prescriptions of the Lancaster House Agreement. 
 The nature of such ‘radicalisation’ 
found expression in increased authoritarianism, the hyper-politicisation of the question of 
7 Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2007. The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted Revolution, in Review of African 
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land re-distribution and increase in anti-imperialist and neo-colonial rhetoric on the domestic 
plane. On the international sphere, it saw a cooling of relations between USA-British8
The two broader premises that will be argued form the basis for the difference in the 
outcomes of Zimbabwe’s negotiations (on the international sphere) between the IMF include:  
 nexus 
and the IMF on the one hand, with the Zimbabwean government on the other. Tentative 
questions that arise therefore include: how did the land reform and the resultant realignments 
(radicalisation) between domestic actors harden the stance of the state towards the IMF and 
vice versa?  
1) ideological differences regarding universalistic neo-liberal socio-political 
prescriptions and conditionalities attached to SAPs and;  
2) the resurging conflict between ‘internationalist’ liberal values and ‘nationalist’ forces9
One of the results of the radicalisation and fast-track agrarian reform was a rapid decline in 
agricultural productivity, which in turn led to a rapid decline in foreign currency earnings and 
reserves. The effects of a rapidly deteriorating economy were exacerbated by an extremely 
costly military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo
 
as contextualised within the rubric of neo-colonialism.  
10
Zimbabwe first incurred arrears to the IMF in mid-February 2001. On 
September 24, 2001, the country was declared ineligible to use the general 
. The immediate effect of 
this was that the country fell into arrears with the IMF. As the Fund noted- 
                                                            
8 Although it must be noted that it would be presumptive to paint the USA and Britain as having exactly the 
same agenda towards their relations with Zimbabwe, this paper thus focuses specifically on their role and 
influence over the IMF rather than as individual countries. 
 
9 The ‘nationalist’ and ‘universalist’ terms are borrowed from Moyo and Yeros’ conceptualization. The 
‘nationalist’ Left they argue is characterized by its advocacy of delinking from the world economy, that is, the 
progressive ‘nationalization’ of the law of value. As such, it recognizes that nationalism is a necessary but 
insufficient ideological force in the periphery. The ‘internationalist’ Left, on the other hand, shuns nationalism, 
especially in the periphery, and defends competitive insertion in the world as a means of growth and 
redistribution. It also commits itself to the institutions and procedures of bourgeois democracy, to civil society 
organizations with external patronage, and especially to urban movements, at the neglect of their rural 
counterparts.  
 
~See, Moyo and Yeros, 2007. The Zimbabwean Question and the Two Lefts. Historical Materialism. Volume 15. 
Pp. 173-4. 
 
10 For a detailed analysis, see: Nest, M. 2001. Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement 
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resources of the IMF and removed from the list of countries eligible to borrow 
resources under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). As of June 
12, 2002, Zimbabwe's overdue obligations totalled SDR11 101.9 million (about 
US$132 million), including SDR 57 million (about US$74million) to the IMF's 
General Department, and SDR 44.9 million (about US$58 million) to the PRGF 
Trust.12
Of significance to this paper is also the acknowledgement of the role and influence that the 
transatlantic developed countries have within the IMF. A central argument presented in this 
project is that inter-state diplomacy (i.e. between Zimbabwe and Britain/USA) found as one 
of its mediums, the IMF.  
 
 
2) Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptualisation 
 
Conceptualising foreign policy. 
Holsti (1995) sees foreign policy as a set of “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to 
solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states, in 
non-state actors (e.g. international institutions) in the international economy or in the physical 
environment of the world.”13
                                                            
11 Special Drawing Rights 
 From the onset it remains pertinent to highlight that foreign 
policies are designed to first and foremost safeguard the national interest, encourage a 
country’s security and survival, autonomy and sovereignty in the international system, to 
attract foreign aid, to reflect a particular ideological standpoint and pursue the particular goals 
of that country. At their disposal countries have an arsenal of instruments with which to 
pursue their foreign policy goals and objectives. These can be cooperative or aggressive in 
nature and include, inter alia, military force or threat thereof, diplomatic channels and 
negotiations; propaganda and terrorism; economic sanctions or incentives. What also remains 
 
12 IMF Press Release. IMF adopts declaration of Non-cooperation for Zimbabwe and Suspends Technical 
Assistance.[Online] http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0228.htm (accessed 04 August 4, 2009) 
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significant is the acknowledgement that foreign policies are neither static nor universal. A 
country’s foreign policies may change over time, prioritising different goals and objectives or 
changing them altogether. The climate of the international system and the global political 
economy have an impact on differing aspects of any country’s foreign policies, as they 
attempt to re-align themselves within this ever changing environment. An illustration is the 
shift in the foreign policy focus of the United States towards Africa after the end of the Cold 
War, going from a policy of communist containment and proxy wars, to one of promoting the 
values of neo-liberalisation through aid packages. 
Although much literature has been generated on the process of foreign policy formulation in 
Africa in recent years14, the task itself is problematic. Many African countries have been 
unable to build up any firm tradition or established pattern of interests behind their foreign 
policy. Within the literature, however, two broad categories dominate: there is the school that 
focuses attention on the premise that most African states’ foreign policies are influenced 
mainly by the global political economy, conceptualising these within the rubric of the 
dependency theory15. It is argued that the African countries continue to perpetuate neo-
colonial and structural core-periphery relations within the global system. In other words, 
many African countries find themselves constrained in their foreign policy objectives in that 
their interactions with developed countries are increasingly ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive’ 
in nature. Adar and Ajulu (2002) detail that within this structural systemic paradigm, African 
foreign polices exhibit two main features: “in the global context compliance constitutes their 
main modus operandi vis-a-vis the donor countries... [and] on another level the African elite 
class continues to promote their neo-colonial core-periphery relations.”16
                                                            
14 Wright (1999), Shaw and Okolo (1994), Aluko (1977)  
 With regards to the 
Zimbabwean case, much of its foreign policy initiatives since independence have been 
informed by a number of principles, including inter alia, anti-imperialism, self-determination 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Pertaining to the issue of 
 
15 This theory is premised on the notion that there is an unequal relationship between poor underdeveloped 
countries in the ‘periphery’, and the rich, developed capitalist states at the ‘core’ of the international system. 
Resources flow from the former to the latter, enriching the core whilst simultaneously impoverishing the 
‘periphery’. 
 
16 Adar, K and Ajulu, R. 2002. Southern African States’ Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy making Process: An 
Introductory Contextualisation, in Adar, K and Ajulu, R (eds) Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African 
States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa. Ashgate Publishing. 
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compliance to the prescriptions of many donor countries, the Zimbabwe case shows the 
contrary. Much of the conflict with Britain, the United States and the IMF resulted precisely 
from the rejection of their ideological, political and economic conditionalities and 
prescriptions. Another critique of this ‘dependency’ approach is it’s assumption that foreign 
policies and diplomacy occur between states that are unitary and rational actors. Furthermore, 
not only do core-periphery relations concern states, but non-state actors also play an 
increasingly significant role. The formulation of foreign policies and their objectives in 
developing countries also results from domestic bargaining between the state and other 
actors, and between the donor countries and International Financial Institutions. 
According to another approach, many correlate African States’ foreign policies with African 
presidents, maintaining that the post-independence ‘big men’ personalised the state 
institutional functions to the extent that there can be no clear distinction between the state and 
the ruler- the psychological-perceptual school17 which argues that African foreign policies 
derive from the president and the presidency.18 Clapham (1977) further details that 
government leaders saw foreign policy as a realm into which they could escape when the 
pressures of domestic politics became too great. Foreign policy gave a leader vital access to 
acquire the resources necessary to grease the wheels of patronage. Instead of reflecting 
broader concerns or aims, African leaders used foreign policy to pay off domestic opponents. 
In this view, foreign policy reflects an extension of domestic patrimonial relationships.19 
Added to this, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001) write, "in environments where the structure of 
participation and contestation, particularly political parties and legislatures, declined 
appreciably, the charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign 
policy.... From this exalted vantage point, foreign policy making emerged as a tool for leaders 
to both disarm their domestic opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic policies.”20
                                                            
17 Ibid 
 
This analysis of African foreign policy formulation is reflected in the Zimbabwean case 
study, where as we shall see later, foreign policy increasingly became the conduit through 
which the differences between the political and economic ideological stances of the IMF and 
18 Ibid. See McKay (1966), Anda (2000) 
 
19 Clapham, C. 1977. Sub-Saharan Africa. In Foreign Policy Making in Developing Countries. Christopher 
Clapham (Ed). Saxon House. Farnborough. 
 
20 Khadiagala, G and Lyons, T. 2001. Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction. In Gilbert M. Khadiagala 
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the country became articulated (through the Office of the Presidency.) Added to this, the 
labelling of opposition forces as ‘puppets of the West’ to the international community by the 
ruling party served to disarm and undermine the MDC’s credibility domestically and 
regionally. 
 
These studies however fail to appreciate the value of other variables that may influence 
African foreign policy. In many post-colonial countries, the power structures and decision-
making procedures lie within the ruling party and not the government. As Wilson and Black 
(2007) argue, “a state's foreign policy is not simply about power and resources: these may be 
important, but foreign policy also includes history, memory, values, structures, and 
legacies.”21  Each state will therefore be influenced by a different set of experiences and 
histories, which will crucially shape how it sees itself and its role in the world. In this view, 
foreign policy is about more than just promoting interests or protecting political power: it is 
also about representing and directing the public imagination.22 This point remains particularly 
resonant in the Zimbabwean case. The portrayal of the ‘fast track’ land reform programme 
and the subsequent sanctions regime imposed against it, according to the government, was 
not only a domestic  issue, but also reflected a broader continental case-study of the war 
against neo-colonialism. The government tried to redirect the ‘public imagination’ both at 
home and abroad by arguing that the inherent economic problems faced by the county 
resulted from external machinations of Western countries. By making the Zimbabwean case a 
developing world, or periphery problem, the government could then gain support for its 
foreign policy stance from other developing countries. Hudson (2005) adds to the debate by 
detailing that “analysts still need to study their subjects in multifactorial, multilevel, and 
multidisciplinary ways”23. Because foreign-policy analysis deals with humans and humans 
possess agency, any comprehensive analysis of a state's foreign policy needs to draw on the 
insights of psychology, cultural studies, and anthropology. Ultimately therefore, foreign 
policy output is a function of the interplay of numerous [factors and] actors.24
                                                            
21 Quoted in Youdem J. 2007. Why Look East? Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy and China. Africa Today. Vol. 53. No. 
3 (Spring). Pp. 4 
 
22 Ibid  
23 Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis 1:1-30. 
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Why Two-Level Games Theory? Reviewing domestic and international co-
dependence/interplay. 
By formalising Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Games hypothesis and applying it to the 
Zimbabwean case, this dissertation will seek to explain how the LRRP shaped the country’s 
foreign policy concerning the breakdown of negotiations with the IMF for the extension of 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Exogenous Shocks Facility (PRGF-ESF). Putnam 
argued that the intersection between domestic politics and international diplomacy requires a 
two-level framework of analysis. Interstate negotiations on the international level (Level 1) 
influence and are constrained by considerations and bargaining between different actors on 
the domestic level (Level 2), and vice versa.  
Why and how then is Putnam’s Two-Level games theory better than other analyses into the 
symbiotic synergies between domestic and foreign policies? Exactly how important are 
domestic factors, actors and developments in determining foreign policy? Our analysis is 
concerned with a radicalised state, one in which matters of state strength and autocracy, 
electoral legitimacy, socio-economic competition and regime legitimacy are more 
pronounced than say in a stable, liberal-democratic state. Therefore the domestic interactions 
between the state, civil society and the main political parties provides a better starting point 
for understanding the country’s foreign policy objectives. As Robert Keohane (2006) 
acknowledged, we need “better theories of domestic politics, decision making and 
information-processing so that the gap between external and internal environments can be 
bridged in a systematic way.”25
In effect, Putnam challenges the neorealist assumption that states are coherent and unitary 
actors by highlighting that the domestic factions that bargain internally will affect the 
outcomes of international negotiations and policy. He notes that as a general rule, “the group 




                                                            
25 Quoted in Stephan, H. Power, M. Hervey, A and Fonseca, R. 2006. The Scramble for Africa in the 21st century: 
A view from the South. Renaissance Press. Cape Town. Pp. 225 
 and on the national level the domestic groups will pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and that politicians seek power by 
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constructing coalitions among these groups. On the international level, national governments 
seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising any 
adverse consequences resulting from foreign developments. Fundamentally therefore, the 
central decision-makers in the country cannot ignore the two games. Putnam clarifies this 
position through the image of ‘game boards’, which he describes thus: 
 
Each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the 
international table sits his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats 
and other international advisors. Around the table behind him sit party and 
parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of 
key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisors. The unusual 
complexity of this two-level game is that the moves that are rational for a 
player at one board (such as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or 
[radical land reform]) may be impolitic for the same player at the other board. 




How then is this image of significance to the Zimbabwean case study? This paper argues that 
leaders within the ruling ZANU PF government were caught squarely between these two 
game boards. On the international plane, the country was constrained by inability to meet its 
loan repayments to the Fund, by adverse trading regimes in the global political economy, 
through the legacy of neo-colonialism, and by the difference in political ideological and 
rhetorical stances28
                                                            
27 Ibid, 434 
 between itself and the US/Britain nexus. This centred particularly on the 
issue of aid conditionalities, sanctions and multilateral pressure. Of particular significance 
 
28 As we shall argue later in the paper, firstly the influence of these two countries on the IMF is significant in 
that their dispute with Zimbabwe found expression through convincing the Fund to take a harder line with the 
country. Secondly, by ideological difference we refer to the portrayal of the US and Britain as proponents of 
neo-colonialism and charged with interference in the domestic political economy of the country. The ZANU PF 
government justified this assertion by highlighting that these foreign countries had sponsored surrogate forces 
in the country to destabilise and bring about regime change. Furthermore, the US’ repeated call for 
democratisation, respect for human and property rights, electoral openness, and so forth were contrary to the 
domestic practicalities and situation on the ground. Domestic bargaining between actors organised around by 
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was the way in which political differences led to economic sanctions from the Western donor 
countries.  
Our point of departure is the acknowledgement that any assessment of the domestic 
determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics and the key 
actors. At the national game board, different factions confronted the government. The first 
was a business elite and civil society grouping that called for democratisation and economic 
liberalisation (the internationalists). The second was a nationalist group in opposition to the 
business elite, which supported the economy’s nationalisation and the LRRP (led by the 
ruling party and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association). The third was 
a significantly powerful political opposition party- the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) and its allies that were in opposition to the government. The government was also 
faced with labour riots and strikes caused by the failing socio-economic situation in the 
country- particularly the rising unemployment and inflation and so on that resulted from the 
failures of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990’s. The essence of this 
paper is therefore to illuminate how the country’s leadership dealt with and bargained with 
these competing factions whilst simultaneously, actively defending itself (and the LRRP) and 
remaining a significant player on the international arena. In other words, how did domestic 
factors and pressures, combined with international pressure create to a radicalised foreign 
policy towards the IMF (and the West)? What were the two-level games of this radicalised 
state? 
The literature regarding the interplay between domestic and international policies and their 
co-dependence is plentiful, but many analyses fail to go beyond the acknowledgement that 
there are ‘domestic influences’ on foreign policy, or provide concrete or systematic 
observations of how or in what way the two interact. One line of theorising arose from 
analysts of regional integration and their emphasis on functional spillovers between domestic 
and international developments. Ernst Haas (1958), for example, detailed the influence of 
parties and different interest groups on the different decision-makers involved in the 
European integration project.29
                                                            
29 Haas, E. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces. University of Notre Dame Press.  
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dependent variables the evolution of supranational institutions rather than a focus on 
particular policy prescriptions.30
In recent years, much of the debate surrounding interstate relations has been dominated by 
the structural or neo-realist school. Because nation states are the key unit of analysis and that 
relations between states are characterised by a quest for power, neo-realists see a distinction 
between high politics of military and state security and the low politics of domestic economic 
and social affairs. Thus, by viewing states as unitary actors, this approach sees the role and 
importance of domestic actors and constraints that determine and shape interstate relations 
relegated to the analytical background of process rather than as significant independent 
variables in their own right. 
 
 The ‘bureaucratic school’ of foreign policy analyses in relations between states, spearheaded 
by Graham Allison (1971) focused more on the “intra-national games, the overlap of which 
constitutes international relations.”31 Although he acknowledged that bureaucratic politics 
and interests matter in international relations, Allison fails to detail the nature of this 
‘overlap’. Keohane and Nye (1977) conceptualise the relationship between domestic and 
foreign policy through what they term ‘complex interdependence’, which refers to situations 
characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.32 
They identify three characteristics of this complex interdependence as firstly, the existence of 
multiple channels that connect countries (interstate, trans-governmental and transnational), an 
absence of hierarchy among issues on the agenda of interstate relationships, and lastly that 
when complex interdependence prevails, “military force is not used by governments towards 
other governments within their region”33. Although this approach was helpful in identifying 
the nature of interdependence between state and non-state actors, it fails to show how the 
domestic forces affect the states’ foreign policy. As they acknowledge, within complex 
interdependence “the distinction between domestic and foreign issues remains blurred.”34
                                                            
30 Putnam, 1988. Pp. 431 
  
Putnam also critiques this approach by highlighting that the emphasis on the role of domestic 
31 Allison, G. 1977. The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown and Company. 
Boston. Pp. 149 
 
32 Keohane, R and Nye, J. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Little, Brown and 
Company. Boston. Pp. 8 
 
33 Ibid, 11 
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factors increasingly slipped out of focus, particularly as the concept of international regimes 
began to dominate the sub-field.35
Another significant contribution that shed light on the influence of domestic politics on 
diplomacy and foreign policy was George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ to the US State 
department in 1946. It explained Soviet behaviour during the Cold War in terms of its 
domestic affairs, argueing that “the party line is not based on objective analysis of the 
situation beyond Russia’s borders [...] it arises mainly from the basic inner-Russian 




   
Significance of ‘Win-sets,’ ‘ratification’ and ‘side-payments’. 
Significant in Putnam’s analysis is the conception of ‘win-sets’. The win-set for a given 
domestic constituency is the set of all possible international (Level 1) agreements that would 
win- that is, gain the majority votes/support among domestic constituents (Level 2). Putnam 
concluded that 1) larger win-sets at Level 1 make agreement more likely, ceteris paribus; and 
2) the relative size of the respective domestic (Level 2) win-set will affect the distribution of 
the joint gains from the international bargain. In other words, chances of success of 
international agreement between states/institutions etc. are determined by how many points of 
common interest exist between them. Secondly, the size of the domestic win-set affects 
which constituents get what size of the international (Level 1) bargain pie. As we shall see 
later in the paper, the conception of win-sets will help us detail the differences in the 
country’s foreign policy towards the IMF (and by extension, the United States and Britain). 
One of the main arguments posited will be that the sizes of the win-sets in both cases were 
different, and ideological considerations played a significant part. 
‘Ratification’ pertains to the decision-making process and outcomes on the domestic level 
(Level 2) which are required to endorse or implement agreement at the international level 
(Level 1). In essence, the agreement between two countries or organisations is subject to the 
constraint that the respective parties must ratify the said agreement. Domestic bargaining 
must therefore lead to ratification of any international agreement. However, although 
                                                            
35 Putnam, 431 
36 Kennan, G. 1946.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942-1952/54. Washington DC. US GPO. (1961-
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conventional conceptions of domestic ratification may indeed seem peculiar to democratic 
countries (e.g. the constitutionally required two-thirds parliamentary majority vote etc) the 
process itself need not be democratic in any normal sense. The bargainers on the domestic 
level may be bureaucratic agencies, parliament, interest groups, public opinion, political 
parties, labour unions etc. 
Because the domestic negotiations in an environment of many divergent actors is more 
difficult than international negotiations, it is significant to take note here of the strategic use 
of ‘side-payments’. By acknowledging that the size of a particular win-set affects the manner 
in which the gains of the international bargain are distributed domestically, it remains 
significant to show how those differences are managed. Frederick Mayer (1992) attempted to 
overcome this difficulty by showing how the existence of side-payment opportunities may 
help reopen the portions of the bargaining set blocked by domestic factions. 37
 
 In other words, 
domestic factions that wish to block ratification of a said agreement can be paid-off or 
compensated for their support. The Zimbabwean case study will highlight that with regards to 
the negotiations with the Fund, many of the domestic factions that were opposed to it 
(particularly the security hierarchy and business elite allied to the government) were given 
the side-payment of economic exploits from the military intervention in the DRC and 
increased trade with China. Rather than argue for aid receipt from the IMF, the government 
effectively used these side payments to bolster its domestic bargaining position. Secondly, it 
remains pertinent to mention that the sanctions regime that had been imposed by the United 
States had affected many in the business sector. Many in this faction allied to the opposition 
were also co-opted into the government’s drive to delink itself from capital emanating from 
the core countries and pursue the ‘Look East’ policy. Although many in the business sector 
remained on an ideological level firmly in the internationalist camp and opposed to the 
government’s nationalist policies, on a practical level they welcomed support for the 
government’s economic foreign policy towards China.  
 
                                                            
37 Mayer, F.1992. Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal 
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3) Research Questions and Limitations 
Our central concern is why did the foreign (economic) policy of the ‘radicalised’ state of 
Zimbabwe lead to negative negotiation outcomes with the IMF between 2000 and 2007? We 
argue that, it is over-simplistic to conclude that loan repayment defaults were the main or 
only reason for the breakdown in relations and its suspension from the loan facility, 
particularly considering that in the same period countries in similar balance of payment 
arrears did not face suspension38
 
. A better framework of analysis emerges when we consider 
the influence of the United States and Britain on IMF decision-making; the nature of 
domestic developments and bargaining; the ideological standoff between supporters of the 
LRRP (nationalists) and those we term ‘internationalists,’ and the impact of the Zimbabwean 
government’s disagreement with the US and Britain over property rights and the political 
conditionalities attached to aid.  
Research questions-  
This dissertation seeks to locate the determinants of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 
2000 and 2007 within the ambit of the two-level games thesis. In doing so we effectively ask 
what the foreign policy towards the IMF was, and analyse why it took such a radical hue. 
The two main questions to be addressed are:  
 
• In what way did the LRRP affect Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the IMF 
and the West between 2000 and 2007?  
• What other factors explain Zimbabwe’s suspension from the IMF in 2001 
besides loan-repayment arrears?  
 
 
                                                            
38 These countries include- Argentina (2001-2005), the Dominican Republic (2004-2005), Ecuador (1999-2000), 
Pakistan (1998-2001), the Russian Federation (1998-2001), Serbia (2000-2004), Ukraine (1998-2000) and 
Uruguay (2004). These countries had, albeit inconsistent, sovereign debt-restructuring negotiations with the 
Fund.  
~See- Diaz, C; Zamora, J and Dominguez, A. 2008. The Role of the IMF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings: 
Implications for the Policy of Lending into Arrears. Banco de Espana Occasional Papers 0805. Online- 
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In addressing these questions, two sub-questions must be answered, namely: 
 
• How did domestic bargaining affect the foreign policies of Zimbabwe towards the 
IMF? 
• What were the domestic determinants of foreign policy in ‘radicalised’ Zimbabwe, 
and in the IMF? 
4) Synopsis of the study 
The first chapter provides a contextual background to the central research problem, provides 
a detailed literature critique regarding differing approaches to foreign policy, and ultimately 
highlights why the Two-Level Games approach is the best. It further identifies the conceptual 
framework within which the paper is placed. The second chapter analyses the country’s 
different phases of land reform and details the nature of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation within our 
given timeframe, highlighting the significance of our main independent variable (land 
reform) in delineating the domestic actors. It identifies the internal and external actors and 
influences involved in the ratification of the negotiations. After providing analysis into the 
relevant players and the domestic situation in the country, this chapter concludes by linking 
the domestic politics to foreign policy. The third chapter is the crux of the dissertation as it 
provides our main case study. It applies Putnam’s theory to Zimbabwe and the IMF. It 
analyses the domestic bargaining and highlights the influence of external factors that 
characterised both sides. It concludes by showing why negotiations for resumption of the use 
of the PRGF failed. Chapter four is the final chapter and gives a summary of the concluding 
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CHAPTER TWO- Zimbabwe’s Land Reform and Foreign Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
Land reform in post-colonial Zimbabwe has always been a highly political subject, whether 
packaged in nationalist or technocratic rhetoric. The literature on the politics of land reform is 
immense, but three phases of land reform since independence can be identified. The first is 
the early independence years from 1980 to 1989, the period of structural adjustment and 
afterwards from 1990 to 1999 is the second, and the third is the ‘fast track’ reform period 
from 2000 onwards.39
 
 Although this last phase is of interest to this project, outlines of the 
first two are provided. The section on the 1980s is to provide the context for the land reform 
processes of the 1990s. The main objective of this section as a whole is to identify the main 
actors, civic and government groups that formed along different fault-lines that resulted from 
the fast track land reform. In doing so we can better evaluate and understand the interactions 
and domestic bargaining between them and the bearing that they had on the different foreign 
policies of the state.  
2. The political economy of land reform in Zimbabwe. 
 
Land Reform in the 1980s- “The Constitutional Yoke” 
Like many newly independent countries, Zimbabwe committed itself to undertaking major 
political and economic restructuring. The task included restructuring a deeply divided society, 
attempting to change an inherited colonial political economy, democratising the inherited post-
colonial authoritarian state, post-war reconstruction and addressing a very polarised and racially 
imbalanced land ownership policy. Land inequalities played a significant role during and after 
the liberation war, and for many academics, politicians and a significant segment of the rural 
population, land reform was perceived to be one of the paramount reasons for fighting the war. 
This was clearly reiterated by the president Robert Mugabe’s analysis of historic linkages on 
                                                            
39 See- Sachikonye, L. 2003. From ‘Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast Track Reform: The Land Question in Zimbabwe. 
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land struggles dating from King Lobengula’s war against British encroachment in 1893, to the 
First and Second Chimurenga40 and as the “core issue and imperative of the Third 
Chimurenga”.41
At independence land inequality was clearly visible. An estimated 6,000 white commercial 
farmers occupied almost 16 million hectares of land; 8,500 small scale black farmers occupied 
1.5 million hectares, and an estimated 700, 000 indigenous communal farming households 
subsisted on 16,4 million hectares, of which 75% was in the drier and less fertile agro-ecological 
regions IV and V. 
  
42 The main objective of land reform in the 1980s was to promote land equity 
in property rights in order to attain political stability, to promote national self-sufficiency, to 
enhance small farmer labour productivity to optimise the self provision of food and basic needs, 
and most significantly, to encourage less skewed income distribution.43
The largest obstacle to the equitable attainment of these goals lay in the constitutional 
provisions of the Lancaster House agreement of 1979. The constitution hampered the state’s 
abilities to tackle land reform in two ways. Firstly, the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle 
enshrined in this constitution ran counter to successful land reform as it protected the interests of 
the white, large scale commercial farmers and prevented the government from acquiring enough 
land to satisfy the demands of the majority rural black population. Secondly, as we shall detail in 
the next section, it simultaneously ensured that within the structures of the government itself, 
there were political gatekeepers tasked with the mandate to protect settler capital through the 
reservation of white seats in parliament. In addition to safeguarding the economic interests of 
the minority white capitalists, the constitution further reduced the space for political and racial 
  
                                                            
40 ‘Chimurenga’ is a Shona word meaning revolution or rebellion that is continuous. The First Chimurenga is 
seen as the country’s first war of independence and was also known as the Second Matabele Uprising (1896-
1897). The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War or Zimbabwean liberation war (1966-
1979) was the principal decider of the succeeding new nation and state of Zimbabwe in 1980. The Third 
Chimurenga was given to the era of land occupations and reform led by ZANU-PF and the so-called War 
Veterans which began in 2000. 
 
~see Muzorewa, G. 2009. Chimurenga Armed Struggles, in The International Encyclopaedia of Revolutions and 
Protest. Immanuel Ness (Ed.) Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell Reference Online. 
[<http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/book?id=g9781405184649_9781405184649>] Accessed January 
20, 2009. 
 
41 Mugabe, R. 2001. Inside the Third Chimurenga. Government of Zimbabwe Press. Harare. Pp. 92 
 
42 Sachikonye, 228. 
 
43 Moyo, S. 2000. The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe 1990-1999. Journal 
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reconciliation. Luc Huyse (2003) shed interesting light on this subject by detailing how after 
independence, most politically active whites continued to see themselves as existing outside of 
the new nation-state. Satisfied with the false sense of economic security safeguarded by the 
constitution, many white capitalists perpetuated prejudices and destructive social relations that 
resulted from the maintenance of pre-independence privileges.44 Prior to the Lancaster 
conference, Western governments had attempted to reassure the white commercial farmers by 
proposing a fund which, inter alia, would guarantee compensation abroad if property rights 
were abused, which at one stage was an estimated $2 billion.45 According to the Patriotic Front 
delegation that represented the liberation forces, western governments also gave assurances of 
financial assistance and funding for post-independence land reform. By 1996 however, only 44 
million pounds of the ‘hundreds of millions’ had been forthcoming,46
An additional problem that the new government faced concerned regional political and 
economic pragmatic considerations. Refusal to ratify the Lancaster House Agreement to end the 
war, or any immediate undermining of the constitution soon after independence would have 
sparked fears that a “radical, revolutionary or vengeful Zimbabwe would give South Africa’s 
apartheid regime the ideal argument to destabilize the post-colonial states in the region”
 and it remains important 
to ask whether this alleged backtrack by the donor countries is the root cause of the failures to 
implement equitable land reform that would have been satisfactory to both the newly resettled 
and commercial farmers.  
47
                                                            
44 Huyse, L. 2003. Zimbabwe: Why Reconciliation Failed, in Bloomfield,D. Barnes, T and Huyse, L.( eds.) 2003.  
Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. Stockholm. Pp. 37 
. A 
point given credence by the destabilisation of Mozambique by apartheid South Africa sponsored 
RENAMO in the 1980s. Economically it therefore made sense for the government to allow 
flexibility towards the white community who were extremely important economic players. With 
the economy performing well and social-economic obligations being met in the country (rising 
employment, increasing enrolment in schools and subsidized health care) there was also not 
much popular pressure on the government for land reform in the early years of independence. 
Therefore, lack of political will on the part of the government added to the perpetuation, for the 
 
45 Thomas, N. 2003. Land Reform in Zimbabwe, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4. Pp 697 
 
46 Ibid. See also- McGreal, C. 2002. The Trail from Lancaster House, Guardian, 16 January. 
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most part, of the land inequalities of pre-independence. In this time-period the pace of land 
reform remained very slow- only 52,000 households had been resettled on 3.5 million hectares 
of land, of the targeted 162,000 to be settled on 9 million hectares.48
 
  
This however is not to argue that the debates around land reform were rendered dormant or 
disappeared completely during this period. On the contrary, land reform became an interesting 
area of academic debate and analysis and a number of differing views emerged. One argument 
disagreed with the resettlement model of land reform, and based much of its critique on the 
argument that the redistribution of large-scale farmland would lead to a dramatic decrease in 
productivity and substantially erode investor confidence.49 Evidence however corroborated the 
contrary in that substantially improved yields and productivity were recorded in most 
resettlement areas. Significantly, the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) in a 1986 
report acknowledged that the “majority of families settled had benefited considerably through 
the provision of increased opportunities for income generation and the availability of services 
such as health and education.”50 A particularly significant proponent of this line of reasoning 
and an increasingly influential trade union in the whole land question at this time was the 
Commercial Farmer’s Union (CFU). The dominantly white CFU lobbied successfully for the 
slowing down of the resettlement initiatives and capitalised on the divisions within the newly 
formed government. As Taylor (1999) details, “the government appeared unable or unwilling to 
redistribute land to peasant communities (the explicit promise of independence) in part due to 
resistance from the CFU and its supporters.”51
 
   
A second argument made by Sam Moyo (2000) focused on the influence of race and its impact 
on the very conceptualisation of land reform. He argued that the dominant conceptual 
frameworks within which the land questions are debated- 
 
                                                            
48 Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis: 1980-1997, in Raftopoulos, B and Mlambo, A (Eds.) 2009. 
Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From The Pre-colonial Period to 2008. Weaver Press. Harare.  Pp.172 
 
49 Palmer, R. 1990. Land Reform in Zimbabwe: 1980-1990, in African Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 355. Pp. 171.  
 
50 Cited in Sachikonye, 230 
 
51 Taylor, S. 1999. Business and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Agricultural Sector, in African Economic 
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 ...evolved from settler-colonial ideology... and are based on three myths: first 
that land rights held by white minorities over land they expropriated enjoys 
social and political legitimacy; second, that the large-scale farms owned by 
whites are efficiently used both in terms of scale of area used and yields per 
unit of land; and third, that freehold tenure and existing private land markets 
are effective and absolutely superior to other forms of tenure such as leasehold 
and customary (so-called communal) tenure.52
 
 
The issue of social and political legitimacy regarding colonially expropriated land returned to 
the forefront of domestic politics from the late1990s, and became a significant justification for 
the ZANU-PF government’s ‘fast-track’ land reform program and shall be analysed in the next 
section. The efficiency of land use by large-scale farmers was exaggerated, as much of the 
agricultural farmland in the 1980s either lay dormant after the war or was neglected by farmers 
who concentrated on the most productive sectors of their farms. The basis of the ‘willing seller, 
willing buyer’ clause of the constitution gave the government the right-of-first-refusal on 
underutilised land and compelled the purchase of such land payable in foreign currency. The 
post-war economic boom also saw a massive increase in the price of land and this further 
hampered efforts by the government to purchase land for resettlement.  
 
Significantly, this underutilisation of land prompted an increase in the number of ‘squatters’ on 
many farms and was the site of sporadic clashes between the police and isolated peasant 
communities who were frustrated with the slow pace of resettlement. Moyo (2004) goes as far 
as to argue that the peasants in this time-period were far more radical than the state with regards 
to land occupations, as the former were not restrained as stringently by the constitutional 
arrangements of the Lancaster Agreement.53
                                                            
52 Moyo (2000), 7 
 The last part of his critique resonates with the 
capitalist path to land reform, which was promoted by the CFU. It involved the slowing down of 
redistribution in favour of improvements in the communal areas based eventually on 
individualised holdings. Essentially the union argued that a relative maintenance of the status 
quo would be a mutually beneficial way of settling land issues. They argued that by 
 
53 Moyo, S. 2004. The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the conference on 
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accommodating the commercialisation of the communal areas, the interests of the large-scale 
white farmers would not be threatened. Significantly, towards the end of the 1980’s this resulted 
in a growing agribusiness sector and an emerging indigenous farming bourgeoisie and 
bureaucracy, with an estimated 70 percent of the population in Zimbabwe dependent on 
agriculture for subsistence and income in the 1980s and one quarter of all wage employment 
was in the agricultural sector. Taylor’s (1999) analysis into the relationship between the CFU 
and the government is instrumental in highlighting the influence of this body within the 
agricultural sector of the country. Domestically, he argues that the recalcitrance of the CFU and 
the white farming community in the face of the government’s stated land reform goals is 
understandable as an issue of economics: the apparent violation of property rights embedded in 
the government’s plan was anathema to capitalist farmers. Internationally, the CFU also enjoyed 
“a measure of foreign influence, or at least it is able to rally, if indirectly, foreign governments 
and donors to its cause in cases where CFU interests may conflict with those of government”54
 
. 
This is most clearly illustrated in the case of land reform. By presenting a moderate, market-
driven approach to land ownership, the CFU rallied to its cause outsiders from within the donor 
community and among the IFIs. During this period therefore, the influential actors that emerged 
concerning the land question were the CFU, which held a significant influence on government 
agricultural policy; an emerging black bourgeoisie produced by the post-war economic boom 
and growing agribusiness sector and a state constitutionally and financially restricted in its 
scope to deliver meaningful land reform. 
 
Land Reform in the 1990’s- “Adjusting to Structural Adjustment and liberalisation” 
 
The 1990s were characterised by a number of factors that deflated the strong post-war boom and 
led to economic decline. Domestically, a series of severe droughts drastically reduced 
agricultural productivity and eroded exports. Internationally, the suspension of an IMF stand-by 
loan facility in 1984 led to an eight-year standoff with the IFI and affected the support of other 
donors. In 1988, the then British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher justified the lack of 
development-oriented finance as due to the fact that Zimbabwe “did not have an IMF 
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programme.”55
If the post-colonial African state was characterised by dependent external linkages to developed 
countries, then the implementation of SAPs further entrenched that dependent relationship. The 
negative effects of SAPs in Zimbabwe have been widely documented
 In 1991, the government adopted the IMF/World Bank Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that would prove to have perhaps the most sever destabilising 
economic and political consequences for the country.  
56. The economy shrank 
from 4 percent to 0.9 percent in 1991, and only marginally improved to 2.9 percent in 
1998/1999. This resulted in massive retrenchment particularly in the civil service, shrinking of 
local government autonomy, which was exacerbated by reduced public spending, and it saw the 
deregulation of prices and removal of subsidies on basic consumer goods. The removal of state 
support in education and health care particularly were most detrimental to the poor population as 
it undermined the country’s reproductive labour. In the rural areas, ESAP resulted in de-
industrialisation of the agricultural sector and thus drastically reduced agricultural output and 
peasant earnings. Ultimately, this exacerbated the national and rural income inequalities, a 
phenomenon made worse by the increased pressure on rural agricultural resources resulting 
from the massive de-urbanisation that followed. This massive return of retrenched urban 
workers to the rural areas in turn brought underlying social tensions concerning racial inequality 
and land ownership back into the forefront of domestic politics.57
                                                            
55Quoted in- Stoneman, C. 1993. The World Bank: some lessons for South Africa, in Review of African Political 
Economy, Vol. 58. Pp 89. 
 The pressure put on 
agricultural resources also came from the fact that 1991-1992 saw one of the worst droughts that 
the country had had. A snapshot of the political economy of liberalisation and land ownership 
inequality in the 1990s was a bleak one- retrenchment and removal of health and education 
 
56 See particularly- Gibbon, P. 1996. Zimbabwe, in Engberg-Pederson, P. Gibbon, P. Raikes, P and Udsholt, L 
(eds.), Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic Liberalisation 1986-1994. Copenhagen and 
Oxford. Centre for Development Research in Association with James Currey, pp. 347-397. 
 
~Stoneman, C. 1991. The World Bank Demands its Pound of Zimbabwe Flesh, in Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 53, pp. 94-96; 
 
~Stoneman, C. 1993. The World Bank: Some Lessons for South Africa, in Review of African Political Economy, 
no. 58, pp. 87-98. 
 
~Bracking, S. 1999. Structural Adjustment: Why it wasn’t necessary and why it didn’t work, in Review of African 
Political Economy.  Vol. 26, No. 80. (Bringing Imperialism Back In.) June 1999. Pp.207-226 
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subsidies pushed people to revert back to agriculture for subsistence, whilst at the same time a 
drought season, reduced government extension and expensive credit severely limited the scope 
for meaningful subsistence. When one adds to this mix the disgruntlement of the rural 
population regarding the highly unequal land distribution demographics, the stage was thus set 
for confrontation between the indigenous population, the white commercial farmers and the 
constitutionally restricted government. 
As Muzondidya (2009) details, the land occupations thus expanded in form and content during 
this period, and led by chiefs and local war veterans, “sporadically invaded not only private 
land, but also state land.”58 Whilst in the post-war boom years land reform was not the main 
priority in terms of policy implementation, the socio-economic situation under structural 
adjustment meant the state could ill afford not to engage with it meaningfully. The dominant 
political alliances in the state had managed to effectively demobilise the radical elements in the 
governments ranks (most notably the war veterans and left-leaning elites) as they sought to 
maintain its inherited neo-colonial structure and pursue liberal market-based economic and land 
reforms. Significantly, in 1990 the constitutional provision on private property expired, and in 
1992 the government introduced the Land Acquisition Act (No. 3 of 1992) which sought to do 
away with the ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ principle and “empower the government to 
compulsorily acquire land for resettlement”.59 Whilst the government sought to resettle 110,000 
families on 5 million hectares, very little progress was achieved, primarily due to resistance 
from the commercial farmers and inefficient resource allocation by the government.60
Agrarian reform as an economic project is essentially political in nature, and involves a myriad 
of actors who simultaneously facilitate and impede the process. In Zimbabwe during the early 
parts of the 1990s, vocal opposition to economic inequality from the indigenous population 
came from both the rural and urban constituencies. Whilst the former focused on the distribution 
of the means of production (land), the latter pushed for the indigenisation of foreign owned 
  
                                                            




60 When the government designated 1,471 farms for acquisition in December 1997, they received 1,393 
objections of which 510 were upheld. 
 
~see Zimbabwe. 2003. Report of the Presidential Land review Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr Charles 
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companies and greater black participation in the economy. Significantly, the aims of both 
constituencies were not mutually exclusive, as the de-racialisation of foreign owned companies 
was directly linked to the de-racialisation of the ownership base of commercial farmland. This 
period saw the formation of a significant number of civil society pressure groups that tried to 
push government and white capital to radically redress the skewed economic relations in the 
country. A conglomeration of black lobby groups, including the Indigenous Business 
Development Centre (IBDC), the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU), Women in 
Business, the Zimbabwe Transport Organisation (ZTO) and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of 
Commerce (ZNCC), was formed in 1990 towards this end. Their limited success however saw 
them being eclipsed by the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) in 1994 which spearheaded a more 
aggressive approach to indigenisation of white capital through pressuring the government, 
creating businesses to obtain funding, political support and other policy concessions for black 
business development.61
 Although the aspiring black bourgeoisie directed their frustrations and resentment at the 
government, they reserved the brunt of their criticism on white capitalists and commercial 
farmers whom they accused of institutional racism. Race once again became the defining lens 
through which inequality was viewed. A series of strikes and attempted boycotts organised by 
various civil society groups in 1994 showed the government that the issue of racial economic 
inequality had to be addressed and could no longer be glossed over through the post-war politics 
of reconciliation with the white elites. Through exploiting the power of popular nationalism and 
the government “managed to harness and redirect this anger towards whites by appealing to 
notions of exclusive black nationalism.”
 
62 Many of the problems in the country, including the 
rising unemployment and a weakening economy were blamed on the whites as the government 
shifted its approach towards a more radical, exclusive stance. It gave peripheral support to some 
of the groups that saw groups used race as an agency for individual accumulation. The organised 
opposition to the status quo by these black elites was exploited by the government and resulted 
in what Jocelyn Alexander (2006) observed as, “the critical shifts in the stakes, terms and 
alliances marking Zimbabwe’s unfolding politics, resource distribution and ownership.”63
                                                            
61 Mazondidya, 191 
 It is in 
the 1990s that we see the government’s gradual shift towards radicalisation.  
62 Ibid 
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In the urban areas, the steady decline in real wages corresponded to the increasingly militant 
agitations of civil society groups and trade unions. The unrest was characterised by recurring 
strike actions and protests against the state. The latter half of the 1990s were characterised by a 
politics of co-optation and confrontation between the state, civil society groups (particularly the 
trade unions) and the indigenous black elites at their helm in the urban areas, and between 
landless peasants in general and war veterans in particular,  and white commercial farmers in the 
rural areas. The widening rift between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and 
the government illustrated the antagonistic relationship between the trade unions and the state. 
The most effective challenge to the seemingly unchallengeable authority of the state came in 
June 1996 when a wide public-sector strike was organised which lasted eight weeks and almost 
ground the country to a halt. The state reacted in a way that was to characterise its relations with 
opposition to its rule for the next decade- by reverting back to the authoritarian tactics of the 
Rhodesian government. It arrested civil society leaders, declared the strikes and protests illegal, 
and refused to negotiate. As protests increased, government repression intensified- the Labour 
Relations Act was amended in 1992, effectively curtailing worker’s right to strike and the 
Presidential Powers Act (No. 1 of 1986) was occasionally deployed to suspend strikes directed 
against the state.64
Whilst initially, groups such as the IBDC were co-opted by the state and supported as vehicles 
against white capitalist interests, the formation of the MDC in September 1999 redrew the battle 
lines, pitting a vibrant new political party with roots in labour and trade unions against the 
government. In the face of declining legitimacy and an opposition with the organisational 
capacity to mobilise the urban workforce against the state, the government brought the issue of 
land reform back to the forefront of the national discourse. On the one side of the spectrum were 
civil society movements focused on labour, constitutionalism and democratisation, whilst on the 
other were the nationalistic forces rooted in the political discourse of anti-imperialism and 
broader Pan-Africanist rhetoric and portrayals of the struggle in Zimbabwe. Suzanne Dansereau 
(2003) for instance highlights these struggles as first and foremost struggles for democratisation 
in the country, of an entrenched elite resisting dislodgement by an opposition party
  
65
                                                            
64 Ibid, 196 
. For her, 
the struggle in Zimbabwe during this period was between competing elites mobilising two 
opposing power bases. The first group employed the rhetoric of the liberation struggle. The 
65 Dansereau, S. 2003. Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe, in Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 
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second comprised of a labour movement that gradually moved away from its alliance with the 
ruling party, and in association with other groups turned to outright opposition. Whilst it may be 
over-simplistic to characterise the diverging forces and movements in the country during this 
period as static and defined clearly as bifurcated forces (urban vs. rural or workers vs. peasants), 
viewing the nature of these relationships within the context of land reform provides a more 
cogent analysis.  
The constitutional referendum pioneered by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the 
MDC and the ruling ZANU PF held in 2000 was particularly instructive in highlighting the 
fault-lines in the country’s political sphere. An important clause in the proposed constitution 
provided for the British to be responsible for compensation for the land confiscated by the state. 
The rejection of the referendum and defeat of ZANU PF marked the first major defeat of the 
ruling party. As a result, the state reverted back to authoritarian tactics against the opposition, 
but most significantly, it shifted the power dynamics in the party itself by creating a stronger 
alliance with the militaristic war veterans. The latter spearheaded the occupation of farms across 
the country and although these were not the first land invasions in independent Zimbabwe, they 
were different in form and context as they had the explicit support of the government. It is 
interesting to point out that the strengthening of the alliance between the state and the war 
veterans and the practical manifestation of the land occupations may have taken a different turn 
had the International Donor Conference on Land, organised by the government in 1998 had had 
a different outcome. The conference hoped to raise Z$1.5 billion to finance a five-year land 
resettlement plan. The governments of the US and Britain “refused to fund the program on the 
grounds that it would not alleviate poverty and failed to respect property rights.”66
From an ideological perspective, we argue that from the onset, the discourses that the opposing 
parties in the country adopted stemmed from two seemingly exclusive bases. The civil society 
and labour grouping that formed the brunt of the opposition to the state in the 1990s (along with 
student bodies, churches and NGOs) had as their core ideology, the post-Cold War global 
 Facing 
external pressure from the international community and the MDC, and internally from the war 
veterans, the ruling party resorted to radical land reform to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
majority through the fast track land reform. 
                                                            
66 Raftopoulous, B. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe, in Becoming Zimbabwe: A historic from the Pre-Colonial 
Period to 1998. Mlambo, A and Raftopolous, B (eds.) Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Weaver Press. 
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discourses of democratisation. They particularly campaigned around issues of human rights and 
constitutionalism and their ultimate aim was that of regime change and removal of the ruling 
party from power. We term these the internationalists. The supposed universalistic prescriptions 
of liberal political and economic norms became the rallying point for the opposition. By arguing 
vehemently for structural change in the political economy of the country through extolling the 
principles property rights, corporate media and freedom of speech, and particularly a human-
rights moralism that is detached from its social context, the internationalists subscribed to the 
notions of democratisation espoused by the liberal Western discourses. In line with their 
objectives, the MDC further portrayed an urgent need for external intervention and supported 
the sanctions regime imposed on the country. This is significant, as Moyo and Yeros (2007) 
argue, because the chosen political strategy of the internationalists was not to “mobilise and 
capacitate the working class for sustained ideological and political struggle against the state... It 
is to rely on externally imposed sanctions as a means of undermining the land reform, the 
economic recovery, and thereby the ‘tyrant’.”67
 
 We contribute by contending that in the context 
of a radicalised state, the calls for the appreciation of the rule of law are a necessary but 
insufficient basis for state contestation. Essentially, what is needed is the recognition and 
understanding of how the rules of the political game are re-evaluated, contested, manipulated, 
invoked or ignored by a ruling party bent on the maintenance of state power. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this project, it is interesting to note that this single-focus issue of contesting 
solely for the capture of the state is characteristic of many opposition parties in Africa. This 
significantly undermines their efforts essentially because they exclude themselves from the 
political rules of the game that the incumbent government creates. 
In contrast to the internationalists, the ruling party and its allies (most notably the War Veterans, 
the security forces, much of the rural population and to a less pronounced extent their regional 
counterparts in SADC68) argued from a different ideological platform. Their stance was rooted 
in Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, radical nationalism and an exclusive patriotic history that 
privileged their role in the liberation struggle and prioritised the centrality of land reform. We 
term these the nationalists.69
                                                            
67 Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp. 175 
 Importantly, this group was effective in portraying the opposition 
68 Excluding Botswana which has always been vocal about its opposition to the ruling party’s domestic policies, 
particularly because much of the internal displacement caused by deteriorating economic conditions saw 
many Zimbabweans migrate to Botswana, putting pressure on their own service delivery objectives. 
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and their allies and ‘puppets of the West’ as they were financed by Western NGOs, international 
civil society groups and white commercial farmers whose land had increasingly coming under 
threat from the government-sanctioned War Veterans.  
 
3. The Radicalised State (2000-2007) 
From the late 1990s the political and economic landscape of Zimbabwe changed dramatically. 
The LRRP notwithstanding, the country also saw the expansion of the indigenous black 
bourgeoisie, saw a militarisation of the security forces against the general public (particularly 
“illegal” urban dwellers and miners), and to a comprehensive state intervention in the market 
through price controls, inter alia. In stark contrast to early post-independence Zimbabwe, the 
country assumed a defensive international relations posture and as Moyo and Yeros (2007) point 
out, two political questions that “have historically galvanised periphery capitalism- the agrarian 
and the national- were returned to the forefront of political life.”70
Following from the destabilizing role played by the widely discredited neo-liberal SAPs in 
worsening the socio-economic environment in the country, the increased calls for amicable land 
reform and from the emergence of the MDC as a viable alternative to the ruling party, the 
political landscape of the country became volatile. Through the Lancaster House Agreement of 
1979, the government had inherited a bona fide neo-colonial state- it led to the adoption of a 
new constitution, which most pertinently, required the recognition of the sanctity of the 
institution of private property in the means of production (see Section 16 of Constitution: 
Freedom from Deprivation of Property.) This provision was to be safeguarded not just by the 
constitution but also through a mechanism that required that there be 20 reserved parliamentary 
seats for white settlers in the new House of Assembly and 10 in the Senate, a provision that 
could only be changed by a 100 percent affirmation vote in the House of Assembly
 As acknowledged in the 
previous chapter, if foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, then it remains pertinent to 
examine these two questions and examine the nature of the state between 2000 and 2007. 
71
                                                            
70 Moyo and Yeros, Pp.103 
. These 
 
71Sibanda, A. (1991) The Lancaster House Agreement and the Post-Independence State in Zimbabwe. Discussion 
Papers, Paper No.9, Zimbabwe Institute for Development Studies, Harare. Pp. 3 
 
~ also see Akokpari, J and Nyoni, T. 2009. Reassessing the Politics of Neo-colonialism and African Solidarity: 
Contextualizing Thabo Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe, in Afrikka: Journal of Politics, Economics and 
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reserved seats were only abolished in 1997. According to Ncube and Nzombe (1991), the key 
purpose of these reserved seats was to enable Britain to control the political and economic 
direction of the state. More significantly, they argue that: 
The entrenchment of the reserved white parliamentary seats for seven years 
and the protection of private property for 10 years were clever imperial 
manoeuvres. The imperialists [colonial settlers] gambled that after ten years 
the black government would have been so co-opted into the capitalist system 
and would accordingly not be willing to interfere with the capitalist system 
and private property mostly owned by foreign multinationals (MNCs) 
individuals and white locals.72
It is therefore significant that 1997 saw the end of this constitutional provision and thus opened 
up the resurrection of the land question. In addition to all the other domestic pressures that the 
state faced, it is in the late 1990s that we see the beginning of the state’s radicalisation. This 
period also saw the state’s rebellion against neo-colonialism and represented its slide towards 
radicalisation- marked by its interventionist role in the economy, the suspension of SAPs and 




 Concerning the land question, 
this radicalisation prompted subversive and hostile responses from the Western powers, IMF 
and World Bank and their domestic internationalist counterparts, as its manner of execution 
strayed from the neo-liberal prescriptions of reduced state intervention in the market.  
Deconstructing the ‘radicalised’ state: cleavages and fault-lines 
From the onset, it therefore remains relevant to clarify the notion of state ‘radicalisation’. By 
virtue of its definition, the term implies a state whose modus operandi represents a shift from 
what is perceived as in line with the ideals of the status quo. In contemporary political literature, 
the term has become synonymous with extremism and has gained wide currency particularly in 
the post- 9/11 political analysis. We seek however to present a more focused and thus more 
relevant definition. This dissertation agrees with Moyo and Yeros’ (2007) conceptualisation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
72 Ncube, W. and Nzombe, S. (1991) Continuity and Change in the Constitutional Development of Zimbabwe, in 
Preben Kaarsholm (ed.) Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern Africa. Baobab Printers. Harare. 167-
181 
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the ‘radicalised’ state, in which they portray Zimbabwe as a country that underwent an 
interrupted revolution74, one in which the state adopted increasingly extreme political and socio-
economic ideas and goals, and convinced itself that the attainment of these goals justified its 
extreme methods. In their assessment the authors develop three main issues with regards to the 
notion of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation. Firstly, they identify the revolutionary situation in which 
state radicalisation reached its climax (2000-2003); secondly they analyse state-society relations 
in the rural areas (as site of the land reform programme); and lastly they argue that a period of 
normalisation occurred between 2003-2005, although it remained “incomplete, contradictory, 
polarised and coercive.”75
 Significantly, they distinguish between a number of terms which have been at the centre of 
descriptions and analyses about Zimbabwe, namely as a totalitarian regime (or as they term it, a 
bourgeoisie dictatorship) and a failed state, and clarify their conception of a radicalised state. 
The former pertains to a situation where although democratic norms and procedures are 
suspended and where the state bureaucracy is bolstered, property rights remain largely intact. 
Failed states on the other hand see the abrogation of formal state procedures and institutions, the 
collapse of the central state and see property rights increasingly come under threat. The common 
denominator between these two concepts is therefore that the social contradictions and conflict 
that they create have “no progressive potential.”
  
76
                                                            
74 This pertains to “a situation in which society is highly mobilised and in conflict, both among its socio-political 
formations and between them and the state. Moreover, it is a situation in which bourgeois institutions come 
under fundamental threat, in a progressive way. In this context, property rights and formal democratic political 
norms and procedures (human rights) are either threatened or abrogated and basic bureaucratic structures 
and hierarchies are themselves threatened or suspended.” 
 The radicalised state on the other hand 
presents a peripheral state that has actively and rapidly rebelled from neo-colonialism through 
its domestic and ultimately foreign policies. The crux of the authors’ argument therefore is the 
nature of this progressiveness which sets the Zimbabwean situation apart from bourgeoisie 
dictatorships or failed states. A particularly salient point that they raise is that the political 
economy of Zimbabwe cannot be understood on an idealised model of a bourgeoisie democracy. 
It cannot be viewed through a model that is located at the centre of the capitalist system and has 
resolved the agrarian-national questions, which are central to the discourse of state-society 
relations in the developing world. The inability to decisively and equitably address the political 
 
75 Ibid, 104 
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economy of land and land reform in many peripheral countries has invariably led to social, 
economic and ultimately political crises. 
What then was the nature and content of this radicalisation in the country? On a practical level 
the main elements of the state’s radicalisation found practical manifestation through the 
abrogation of agrarian property rights, increased socio-political conflict and the partial 
suspension of formal democratic norms and procedures. The ideological fuse to this powder keg 
came in the form of the rapid radicalisation of nationalism (or radical populism) which gave 
momentum and credence to the land reform program. In response to the external pressure of 
imposed sanctions from the United States77 and other donor countries, and to increased domestic 
pressures from the MDC and their alliance partners, the government radically changed the focus 
and goals of their domestic and foreign policies. Essentially, the policy changes that were 
radically revised by the government were in investment policy, monetary policy, fiscal, land, 
trade and foreign policy78
 The centrality of the land reform in the post-colonial state of Zimbabwe can hardly be disputed. 
Although there have been mixed assessments of the impact of radical land reform, one can 
identify a number of observations. Firstly, the land reform brought racial inequality back into 
the forefront of political and economic discourses in the country. The land reform program 
effectively “broke the back of white land ownership in the country and transformed the legacy 
of the colonial land dispensation.”
. Although these will be analysed in detail in the next chapter, it 
suffices to mention here that their changes were markedly different from the period prior to and 
during the adopted Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Furthermore, they 
were the main areas of contention between the government and the IMF, and drew the brunt of 
criticism from both internal and external analyses. 
79
                                                            
77 The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) was passed by the US Senate in 2001. This 
law stipulates that “The US Secretary of State shall instruct the United States executive director to each 
international financial institutions to oppose and vote against: 1) any extension by the respective institution of 
any loan, credit or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe, or 2) any cancellation or reduction of 
indebtedness owed by the government of Zimbabwe to the US or any IFI. (Quoted in the New African, 
August/September 2007, Pp.118) 
 Whilst in 2000 approximately 4500 white farmers owned 
11 million hectares of land and produced seventy percent of commercial agricultural output, by 
 
78 Each will be analysed in detail in the next chapter. 
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2007 there numbered approximately five hundred.80 Secondly, a significant majority of 
previously disadvantaged communal peasantry and poor indigenous farmers benefitted from the 
LRRP as “new petty-commodity producing establishments accounted for 93.7 percent of the 
new farming establishments”81 and thus gained a meaningful stake in the economy. The LRRP 
however was not positive on all fronts as hundreds of thousands of farm workers were displaced 
and were excluded from the benefits of the programme by the war veterans and security forces, 
whilst the occupations led to a decline in employment levels. Categorised as ‘enemies of the 
state’ along with white farmers, they were subject to some of the worst election violence 
between 2000 and 200282
4. Conclusion 
. Furthermore, many of the beneficiaries of the land reform often 
found themselves constrained inter alia, by a lack of access to financing, deteriorating 
infrastructure and the breakdown of specialised production systems. In addition, regarding its 
heterodox policies, the contrast between the ideology of anti-imperialistic self-determination 
and the practical contradictions on the ground has been wide. This is due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, the state has largely been hampered by its failure to widen its social base and extend its 
popular support.Secondly, its capacity to provide meaningful safety nets for the people most 
affected by the deteriorating economy lagged far behind realistic levels, as planning capacities 
of the state bureaucracy have been inadequate for the task. The socio-economic realities of 
deteriorating health care, tertiary education and ‘brain drain’ have meant that crisis management 
in the face of sanctions, rather than meaningful development and the support structures that 
bolster it, has been the modus operandi of the ruling party. 
Although the need to redress land imbalances at independence and throughout the 1980s was a 
pertinent issue, the process itself failed to reach it stated goals and was not a major priority for 
the government. The constitutional yoke that resulted from the Lancaster House Agreement 
hampered land reform and fervent calls for distribution from an indigenous minority were muted 
by a booming economy. The introduction of ESAP in the 1990s created pressures for the 
majority of the urban and rural population alike and the declining economic situation, coupled 
with the withdrawal of the state from social safety-net provisions, coalesced the numerous 
groups who increasingly agitated for intervention from the state. This situation culminated in the 
                                                            
80 Matondi, P. 2008. Shaping and Stewarding Replacement amidst Uncertainty of fast track land reform in 
Zimbabwe. Unpublished Paper. Harare.  
81 Moyo, 2000 
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divorce between the ruling party and the ZCTU who, along with other groups, created and 
spearheaded the formation of the MDC, who presented the first real political challenger to 
ZANU PF. Its slide to authoritarianism and radical policy decisions alienated the state from 
many in its support base. Furthermore, the land issue returned to the forefront of the national 
discourse and was harnessed by the state, with the redistribution of land became its main vehicle 
for regaining its legitimacy. Most significantly for our purposes, the fast track land reform 
programme also served to delineate a number of different actors that competed for legitimacy 
and power in the country’s political space. Internally these were civil society and labour groups, 
constitutional movements, white commercial farmers and the MDC on the one hand, and the 
ruling ZANU PF, war veterans, security forces and those in the business elite who had benefited 
from the patronage of the state. The external groups that sought influence in the crisis through 
allying themselves with the internationalists were a number of international donors and NGOs, 
most notably USAID, a coalition of developed countries including the United States and British 
governments and by proxy the IMF. Those who supported the incumbent government included 
the Chinese government, SADC and the African Union. Foreign policy during our period was 
therefore a result of the interplay and bargaining between these different actors. Although 
foreign policy is the sole mandate of the state, it remains significant to show how these different 
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In attempting to provide an interest-group explanation of government agricultural policies, 
Robert Bates (1981) argued that agricultural policies are essentially a bi-product of political 
relations between governments and urban constituents83
Although negotiations between Zimbabwe and the IMF were somewhat consistent during the 
1980s and 1990s
. His main premise for this claim was 
that whereas urban consumers and producers have considerable influence on the political 
system, those who live in the rural areas have been relatively marginalised due to their 
inherent difficulties in mobilising effectively for collective action and through co-optation by 
wealthy farmers. Whilst this may have held true in the first decade of the country’s 
independence, in Zimbabwe from 2000 onwards, the converse held as true. The influence of 
the urban constituents and the capacity of the wealthy commercial farmers to co-opt the 
process of land reform were drastically undermined as a direct result of the radicalisation of 
the state. Empirically, it was the rural constituents, who through the somewhat haphazard 
leadership of the war veterans, and principally through the ruling party and its exploitation of 
radical nationalism, who became the principal interest groups in the land reform process. 
Because at its core, the main policy changes undertaken by the government ran counter to the 
logic of the Western dominated neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, from the onset it became 
clear that it was on a collision course with the pro-liberalisation IMF. We locate the 
determinants of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy during this period within the ambit of the two-
level game thesis. In doing so we effectively seek to ask what the foreign policy towards the 
IMF was, but also analyse why it took upon such a radical hue. 
84
                                                            
83 Quoted in Skalnes, T. 1989. Group Interests and the State: An Explanation of Zimbabwe’s Agricultural 
Policies, in Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 1. Pp. 87 
, the onset of the land reform and the widening of the arrears to the Fund 
led to the country’s suspension from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 
2001. We argue that it is over-simplistic to claim that this suspension was based solely on the 
country’s inability to meet its repayment obligations, particularly considering that in the same 
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period countries in similar balance of payment arrears did not face suspension.85
 Most criticism levelled against the IMF has concerned the issue of conditionalities attached 
to the aid they provide,
 Central to 
our analysis in this section, we question the impact of IMF structural adjustment programs on 
political instability and on regime or polity characteristics, aimed towards regime change. In 
other words, what were the political variables that underscored the relationship between the 
country and the Fund since the inception of the land reform programme?  
86 and the ‘one-size-fits-all’ programs to countries whose political and 
economic structures vary greatly. The reputed orthodoxy of IMF programs is rooted in the 
dominant Western neo-liberal economics mainstream, and selects its adjustment measures 
“from a standard list of monetary and fiscal restraint, external liberalisation and 
devaluation.”87 Heterodox solutions to balance-of-payments problems thus fall under heavy 
scrutiny to determine their compatibility with this orthodoxy. Such an acceptability-set for 
IMF programs is thus a bargaining advantage for the Fund, as “a program presented by a 
national government seems to stand a higher chance of approval...if it contains measures on 
that list, and a high probability of failure if it does not.”88
                                                            
85 These countries include- Argentina (2001-2005), the Dominican Republic (2004-2005), Ecuador (1999-2000), 
Pakistan (1998-2001), the Russian Federation (1998-2001), Serbia (2000-2004), Ukraine (1998-2000) and 
Uruguay (2004). These countries had, albeit inconsistent, sovereign debt-restructuring negotiations with the 
Fund.  
 However, unlike international 
treaties, agreements with the IMF do not carry the same reputational consequences if 
breached. How then do we analyse reasons for defection or distinguish between voluntary 
and involuntary defection, or breaches to any negotiated agreement? We begin by adopting 
~See- Diaz, C; Zamora, J and Dominguez, A. 2008. The Role of the IMF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings: 
Implications for the Policy of Lending into Arrears. Banco de Espana Occasional Papers 0805. Online- 
[http://ideas.repec.org/p/bde/opaper/0805.html] Accessed 12 July 2009. 
 
86 ~See particularly- Mlambo, A. 1993. Towards an Analysis of the Role and Impact of IMF Structural 
Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Zambesia. Vol. 20, No. 1. 
 
~Moore, W and Scarritt, J. IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis, in 
Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 4, The Human Condition and Structural Adjustment in Africa (4th Qtr., 1990), pp. 39-
60 
 
~Nelson, S and Wallace, G. 2005. Conditional Credibility: Explaining the Impact of the IMF on Democratisation. 
Cornell University. New York. Paper Presented for the 2005 American Political Science Association meeting, 
September 1-5, Washington DC. 
 
87 Kahler, M. 1993. Bargaining With The IMF: Two-Level Strategies and Developing Countries, in Evans, P. 
Jacobson, H and Putnam, R (eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 
University of California Press. Berkeley. Pp.365 
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Miles Kahler’s (1993) image of the IMF as a country, with similar internal and external 
political considerations that constrain and determine its bargaining strategies. Following an 
account of how ‘domestic’ politics impinge on international behaviour between IMF and the 
country and on the broad available strategic options on either side, we seek to identify the 
reasons for the negotiations failure. Furthermore, this case study will tease out the complexity 
of two-level games that Putnam identified- that moves that are rational for a player on one 
board (e.g. radical land reform), may be impolitic for the same player on the other board (e.g. 
resulting in loan facility suspension, sanctions etc). 
 
2. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards The IMF 
 
Domestic Policy and Win-Sets: the IMF’s Level 2 
As acknowledged earlier, any two-level theory of international negotiation must be rooted in 
a theory of domestic politics, that is, a theory about the power and preferences of major actors 
at Level 2. Our analysis is focused on the negotiations between Zimbabwe and the IMF 
regarding its 2001 suspension from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)89. In 
contrast to the General Resources Account (GRA) this programme “focuses on each 
country’s poverty reduction and growth priorities and as long as macroeconomic stability is 
maintained, seeks to respond flexibly to changes in country circumstances and pro-poor 
priorities”90
                                                            
89 Zimbabwe fully settled its arrears to the GRA in February 2006. However, cooperation remained weak and 
Zimbabwe still has substantial arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust. The Executive Board decisions with respect to the 
suspension of Zimbabwe’s voting and related rights in the Fund, its ineligibility to use the Fund’s general 
resources, and arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust remain in place. According to the Fund, “because GRA and PRGF 
arrears are subject to separate legal frameworks-the former under the Fund's Articles of Agreement and the 
latter under the PRGF-ESF Trust Instrument-the clearance of GRA arrears by Zimbabwe has no effect on the 
application of the Fund's procedures for the treatment of outstanding arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust. 
Zimbabwe, therefore, remains excluded from the list of PRGF-eligible countries.” 
. It is also centred on two important elements- broad public participation and 
country ownership (through country specific Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and good 
governance. PRGF-supported programs are designed to cover only areas within the primary 
responsibility of the IMF, unless a particular measure is judged to have a direct, critical 
 
~See IMF. 2001. Press Release 01/40- IMF Declares Zimbabwe Ineligible to Use IMF Resources. Online- 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2001/pr0140.htm Accessed June 24 2009. 
 
90 IMF. 2009. Factsheet- The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Online- 
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macroeconomic impact. Areas typically covered by the IMF include advising on prudent 
macroeconomic and financial policies and related structural reforms such as exchange rate 
and tax policy, fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency, and tax and 
customs administration. 
The organisational and political dynamics of the IMF mimic those of a country in a number 
of ways and allow for an analogy to a government, “with its division between spending 
ministries, and auditing or controlling ministries.91” As Kahler (1993) identifies, a Managing 
Director (MD)92 must win ratification of a program from the Executive Board of the IMF, 
which will in turn apply the principle of uniformity of treatment to most programs, 
scrutinising them carefully to detect radically better deals for one country or class of 
countries than others93
All members of the IMF have a quota, which is roughly correlated with their weight in the 
world economy. This quota determines how much a member must contribute to the Fund’s 
resources upon joining, how much it can borrow and its percentage of votes on the Executive 
Board. This system significantly skews the relative influence of developed members over 
developing members, with voting weights ranging from the United States with just over 20 
percent of the votes, to the smallest members with just over one percent. Thus, the effect of 
weighted voting is that “the dominant coalition is that of the industrialised countries, 
particularly the G-5: the US, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
. The internal politics of ratification however are more important than 
the organisational determinants of the IMF. Reverting to our analogy of the IMF as a mini-
state, we see that it has its own conflicts between those with an interest in lending and those 
with an interest in checking those tendencies. The Executive Board of the Fund represents a 
complicated set of national constituencies and only the largest economies have their own 
representatives of the Board. 
94
                                                            
91 Ibid 
” Although 
the system of special majorities  that requires more than a simple majority  of votes on certain 
issues helps to encourage bloc voting (developing countries etc), it increases the veto power 
the US and its European allies. As such, the industrialised countries not only hold immense 
 
92 The Executive Board consists of 24 Executive Directors- the five most powerful members each appoint a 
director whilst the Funds membership appoints the rest.  
 
93 Ibid  
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influence on the Executive Board, but also in the selection of the Managing Director95
Most significantly, Kahler (1993) points out that “board members signal to the MD and staff 
their qualms about program design and their wishes for the future direction of Fund relations 
with particular countries.”
 and 
decisions pertaining to resource allocation within the Fund.  
96
In order to effectively analyse the domestic and international interplay between our cases, we 
must ask what qualifies as the ‘win-sets’ that the Fund considers acceptable in their 
negotiations? In other words, what is set of all possible international (Level 1) agreements 
that would gain the majority votes/support among the Fund’s domestic constituents (Level 
2)? The IMF provides short-term loans to countries facing balance-of-payments crises in 
order to help stabilise their economies till they can settle their external accounts. The logic of 
these arrangements is to ensure that countries do not revert to devaluation, protectionism, 
import restriction and other measures deemed to be detrimental to free global trade and 
investment flows.
 Secondly, the process of ratification of a country’s program with 
the IMF is thus a constant process of discussion between the IMF’s most powerful members. 
Concerning its own domestic (Level 2) games therefore, the key role of the MD or ‘chief of 
government’ is to read the preferences of these key constituencies correctly, whilst at the 
same time expanding the scope and scale of IMF activities. The most salient example of this 
occurred in the late 1980s and through 1990s when the preferences of the industrialised 
countries regarding IMF programs focused on tighter conditionalities. This was precipitated 
by the debt crisis of 1982 in the former, and was in tune with their post-Cold War 
democratisation projects in the developing world in the early 1990s. 
97 The national authorities in close cooperation with the IMF design a 
policy program supported by IMF financing, and continued financial support is conditional 
on effective implementation of this program98
                                                            
95 In February 2000 the Board elected Horst Kohler as its Managing Director, the former president of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
. We can thus surmise that successful 
 
96 Ibid, 368 
 
97 Hellelner, G. 1983. The IMF and Africa in the 1980s. Princeton University Press. Princeton. Pp. 7 
 
98IMF. 2010. Why the IMF was created and how it Works. Online. 
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ratification of any adjustment program or loan extension99
The unstated ‘win-sets’ however are tied into issues of democratisation and human rights 
conditionalities, and to the influence of the most powerful of the Fund’s members. Although 
the IMF has no confessed interest in human rights or political freedoms, it remains significant 
that these political variables are an instrumental feature of the democratisation projects of the 
principal members of the IMF. In essence, issues of good governance, in line with the 
neoliberal discourse, are an integral determinant of sovereign lending. In a study on the 
determinants of IMF sovereign lending, Jah and Saggar (2001) concluded that there is indeed 
a measure of arbitrariness in the way the institution lends to different countries. They found 
that unimpaired access to private financing of payments imbalances is generally available to 
some important countries in the world economy, but not to all countries and not under all 
circumstances. 
 is dependent on three general 
prescriptions. Firstly, that the program is in line the preferences of the principal or most 
influential members of the Fund. Secondly, that any country drawing from the Fund must 
adhere to certain conditionalities which may be economic or political in nature. Lastly, that 
the extent to which the drawing country has liberalised its economy is satisfactory. These are 
the stated broad ‘win-sets’ of the Fund. 
100
As we shall see, the influence of the largest contributors to the Fund (for our purposes we will 
focus on the United States) is a particularly significant factor affecting international loan 
agreements. The reasons for this include that in the 1980s critics argued that the Fund had 
become overtly political. As Kahler (1993) argued, “lending decisions were forced through 
by creditor countries, in particular the USA, with the clear objective of preventing specific 
debtor countries from defaulting and thereby damaging the interests of the large commercial 
banks that still had significant loans outstanding to them”
 
101
                                                            
99 To clarify, the negotiations we are concerned with regard the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility- 
Exogenous Shocks Facility Trust (PRGF-ESFT) and not the General Resources Account (GRA).  
. The Fund’s defence that this 
was justified in order to ensure systemic stability became increasingly illegitimate as the 
 
100 Jah, R and Saggar, M. 2001. The Determinants of Sovereign Borrowing from the IMF, in Economic and 
Political Weekly. Vol. 36, No. 36. Pp. 3467-3471 
 
101 Bird, G. 2001. A Suitable Case for Treatment? The Ongoing Debate about the IMF, in Third World Quarterly. 
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banks themselves adjusted to the crisis by provisioning, by reducing their developing country 
exposures through the secondary market, and by expanding other lines of business. 
 
Domestic Policy and Win-Sets: Zimbabwe’s Level 2 
For any developing country, negotiations over adjustment programmes are often politicised 
and the process provides an interesting corroboration of our two-level games hypothesis. 
Kahler (1993) highlights how this politicisation occurs along three dimensions. The first 
regards ideological resistance to IMF prescriptions: i.e. objections to the Fund’s economic 
model, market-oriented prescriptions or its overriding emphasis on balance-of-payments 
adjustment rather than other goals such as growth or equity. This line of resistance became a 
prominent feature in Zimbabwe because the political sphere was largely organised along 
ideological lines and divided between the pro-market opposition and the pro-nationalisation 
ruling party, and particularly the government’s prioritisation of income redistribution over 
fiscal restraint. The second line of resistance is linked to the first and occurs along the 
nationalist fault-line.102 This pertains to sensitivity to notions of sovereignty and opposition 
to any apparent subordination of national policy to external forces and the government’s fear 
of being portrayed as an agent of industrialised countries or international capital. In the 
Zimbabwean case, mobilised nationalist appeals directly affected negotiations and became 
the screen behind which the ruling party justified radicalisation in defence of the country’s 
economic interests. These economic interests form the third dimension of resistance and 
focus on the groups whose political or economic well-being are likely to be affected by the 
agreed policy changes. As we detailed earlier, organised labour and the urban popular classes 
were affected most severely in the short term by ESAP through, inter alia, the decline in real 
wages and dismantling of subsidies. Significantly therefore, “the resistance of these sectors of 
the economy often figure into the calculus of politicians who survey the [domestic] Level 2 
bargaining required for implementation, if not formal ratification, of an IMF program.”103
Jeffery Herbst (1990) detailed not only the negative effects of structural adjustment on the 
state, but also on the impact that it had on the state type.
  
104
                                                            
102 Kahler, 370 
 Significantly, he showed that the 
103 Ibid.  
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major instruments of structural adjustment (such as devaluation and public sector reform) 
threaten to “change not only the constituencies that African leaders look to for support but the 
way in which leaders relate to their supporters.”105
By detailing these political consequences of structural adjustment, we can identify what 
therefore constituted the ‘win-sets’ for the government. Firstly, we must acknowledge that the 
degree to which a political elite expects to face regular tests (such as contested elections) will 
influence its acceptable set of outcomes in a negotiations with the IMF.  Fundamentally, the 
provision of financial and technological support to land reform, and the protection of 
economic interests (particularly those of the ruling elite), was of paramount importance to the 
government. The main proviso to this however was ideological. Through the adoption of 
policies that fell within the discourse of anti-imperialism and a rejection of the neo-liberal 
economic dictates of its so-called Western ‘enemies’, the government could attempt to regain 
its legitimacy in the eyes of its main constituency. Its radical nationalistic rhetoric also served 
to bolster the perception by its regional neighbours and LDC allies that sanctions and 
international condemnation of the land reform program were biased against a country seeking 
to defend its sovereignty from foreign interference. Secondly, the elites who would have the 
 The retreat of the state from the market 
and removal of subsidies, and the formation of the MDC in the Zimbabwean case, changed 
the composition of the different constituencies. In a broad sense, the cosmopolitan urban 
population became the main bastion for the opposition and bore the brunt of the 
authoritarianism of the ruling party. At a basic level, the client-patron relations that the 
government had initially reserved for the emergent black elite in the midst of the failing 
economy in the 1990s became severely restricted by the reductions in the size of the state in 
the economy. The curtailment in its ability to provide patronage made the state much less 
flexible in dealing with the subsequent political crisis. Because land reform became the 
vehicle for loosening the pressure valves of increased political competition and decreasing 
legitimacy, only a heterodox economic policy could be adopted by the government to correct 
the economic and political distortions created by ESAP. The priorities of the radicalised state 
thus reverted from focusing on free-market fundamentals, to prioritising radical land reform 
and the majority rural peasant farming constituency. This was in stark contrast to early post-
independence Zimbabwe, where the white commercial farmers remained largely undisturbed 
and the indigenous urban elites and party loyalists were recipients of state patronage. 
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most to lose from a successful regime change perspective (the ruling party, those business 
elites linked to ZANU-PF, the military security forces high command etc) necessarily had to 
ensure that any negotiation that threatened their hold on power would be rejected, or 
undermined by pressuring involuntary defection.  
In the previous chapter we differentiated between the different competing groups in 
Zimbabwe’s domestic political economy (Level 2), which we identified as falling under the 
umbrellas of ‘internationalists’ and ‘nationalists’. The bargaining between these two groups 
consisted of a constantly shifting negotiation strategies and delivery of important side-
payments on both sides. We now turn to these elements. 
 
Incorporating the Two-Level Game and the Impact of Side-Payments on the negotiations. 
Given the prescriptions for eligibility to receive support from the PRGF, we can see that 
whilst the IMF’s stated reasons for Zimbabwe’s suspension as the latter’s debt arrears, a 
deeper analysis cannot exclude the impact of the LRRP. The neo-liberal economic logic of 
IMF policies dictates that there are certain market fundamentals that are requisite for poverty 
reduction and economic growth, contingent particularly on a country’s economic emersion 
into the global economy. What remains markedly unique about the Zimbabwean case 
however, was the manner in which it handled the nexus between its domestic political and 
economic contradictions, and external pressures from the international political economy. In 
analysing the two-level games of the country’s negotiations with the IMF, we necessarily 
must remain cognisant of these contradictions. In the previous chapter we saw the context 
within which the Zimbabwe ‘radicalised’ and it is through the lens of this state type that we 
can see how the win-sets between the two failed to sufficiently overlap. 
In its yearly Article IV report, the IMF produced a laundry list of causes for Zimbabwe’s 
economic decline, including loose fiscal and monetary policies, a fixed exchange rate highly 
out of sync with “street prices,” and price controls106
                                                            
106 Richardson, C. 2006. Learning from failure: Property Rights, Land Reform and the Hidden Architecture of 
Capitalism, in Development Policy Outlook. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. No. 2. Pp. 
1. 
. The large-scale redistribution of one of 
the pillars of the economy through the land reform; the declining economy resulting from 
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necessitated the heterodox economic planning that the country undertook. Moyo and Yeros 
(2007) identify six policy changes that clearly highlight the change in the state-society 
domestic relationship, and in the external relationship between the government and the IMF. 
Firstly, in investment policy the government heavily regulated banks and redirected credit to 
the agricultural and mining activities. In monetary policy, it introduced price controls, set 
interest rates and foreign exchange with the aim of supporting priority imports and exports 
whilst defaulting on foreign debts107. In fiscal policy, it subsidised commodities such as basic 
foods, fuel and electricity. In trade policy, it imposed import and export controls focused on 
essential commodities, diversified trading to partners in the East under its ‘Look East’ policy 
and reinforced parastatals to regulate trade. In land policy, it continued to nationalise land 
under its LRRP. In foreign policy, the government maintained its antagonistic stance towards 
the United States and Britain in particular through its anti-imperialistic rhetoric and portrayal 
of itself as a country defending its sovereignty in the face of malicious machinations from the 
West. In doing so, it actively opposed the liberalisation agenda of the WTO and shifted its 
strategic economic and technological alliances to the Asian countries (especially China) and 
away from dependence on the West.108
 
 These policy changes formed part of a heterodox plan 
that the government adopted and represented a combination of reactionary strategic planning, 
increased authoritarian control and little tolerance for dissent, and mostly took the form of 
incoherent crisis management. In line of these changes, and regarding Putnam’s assessment 
that, ceterus paribus, the larger the win-set then the likelihood of agreement becomes higher, 
was there, in effect, a significant overlap between the win-sets of both the IMF and 
Zimbabwe? 
• External Conditionalities vs. Domestic Priorities 
As Carolyn Jenkins (1997) recognised, “there are two remarkable features of post-
independence economic policy-making in Zimbabwe: the very limited nature of the changes 
made by the new government in 1980, and the complete reversal of policy announced in 
                                                            
107 Repayments resumed in 2005 in the interests of normalisation of relations with the Fund. 
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[2000]”109. What remains starkly evident from this about-turn is that the overlap of win-sets 
of both the government and the IMF was drastically reduced. In other words, the positions of 
both ensured that there would be few areas of common interest between the coalitions on 
both Level 2s. The conditionalities that the country needed to accept were incompatible with 
the political priorities of the ruling party and its nationalist counterparts. Firstly, as detailed 
before, land reform and radical nationalism was used as an attempt to regain legitimacy when 
they faced political opposition. For them to accede to orthodox exchange rate and fiscal 
transparency initiatives, for example, would have been imprudent as support for the regime, 
at an elite level, was principally based on patronage relations and corruption was endemic110. 
A particularly salient point that bolsters this analysis regards the military intervention in the 
DRC and the resultant strategic side-payments that went to the military and security high 
command. Two explanations for the intervention are evident in the literature- that the 
intervention was necessitated by Zimbabwe’s role as the Chair of the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,111 and the view that it was motivated by “the 
ruling elite’s desire to obtain lucrative supply contracts and mining partnerships, as well as to 
protect existing investments.”112 Domestically, commercial links between the ruling ZANU 
PF and the political and military elites, “indicated some degree of systematic use of official 
positions for private gain.113
 Frederick Mayer (1992) argued that both their interests and the rules of the domestic political 
game, determine how domestic factional interests manifest themselves in international 
bargains. Regarding Zimbabwe, it can reasonably be argued that if there was dissension in the 
security hierarchy, then commercial exploits would have been a sufficient side payment to 
co-opt those oppositional elements. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the historical 
relationship between the military and the ruling party had always been strong since the 
” 
                                                            
109 Jenkins, C. 1997. The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe, in Journal of Modern African Studies. 
Vol. 35, No. 4. Pp. 575 
 
110 The inflexibility of the state in this regard was illustrated by the firing of then Finance Minister, Simba 
Makoni, who was vocally pro-devaluation. 
 
111 See SADC. 1996. Communiqué from the 1996 Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit to Launch the SADC Organ. 
Online- http://www.sadc.int/archives/read/news/231 Accessed 06 July 2009. 
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liberation struggle, with many government officials having served in the armed forces and the 
hierarchy remaining largely the same in the armed forces. Secondly, in the face of the 
deteriorating economic situation in the country, financial incentives would have held more 
sway than calls for democratisation. Lastly, the co-optation of the military and security 
apparatus served to provide three additional benefits for the government: bolstering its 
regional standing through decisive action in defence of a SADC member, revitalising its 
national identity and radical nationalism, and encouraging the security hierarchy to remain 
loyal to the ruling party and undertake its coercive mandates. In this way, a significant faction 
that was essential for the maintenance of the regime was therefore effectively co-opted into 
the rules of the domestic political game. Tellingly, whilst IMF sanctioned Zimbabwe for its 
war expenditures, it continued to lend to Uganda, whose troops supported the rebels in the 
Congo.  
The most sever contradiction resulting from the deep structural change114 precipitated by land 
reform and state radicalisation was the persistent violence between the state (through its 
monopoly over the use of force) and those in opposition to it. Authoritarianism115 and 
coercion, particularly during the elections of 2000 and 2002, remained the modus operandi of 
the ruling party116
                                                            
114 In terms of state-society relations, land ownership and income redistribution. 
 and diverged widely from the good governance prescriptions of rule of law 
and human rights. The dominant analyses into the state’s coercion in the literature have 
emotively tended to view it as a moral issue, or measured it against the norms of democratic 
theory. As acknowledged, Zimbabwe during our timeframe was neither a democratic nor a 
failed state. Rather than view state repression in our period as simplistically right-or-wrong, 
we portray it within the context of radicalisation. In other words, the suspension of the rule of 
law and employment of coercion by the state were neither arbitrary nor random, but were 
strategically employed because radical land reform in a neo-colonial setting could not have 
 
115 As exemplified by the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002 ,which severely curtailed freedom of assembly and require journalists and media 
companies to register with the government-controlled Media and Information Commission (MIC). 
 
116 See ~ International Crisis Group. 2002. All Bark, No Bite- The International response to Zimbabwe’s Crisis. 
Africa Report. No. 40. Harare 
 












51 | P a g e  
 
occurred within the confines of liberal-democratic prescriptions117. Radical large-scale land 
redistribution cannot occur in a peripheral context where property and human rights take 
precedence; the two are essentially oxymoronic and mutually exclusive. To whom, to what 
extent and how do you distribute land if property rights remain intact? We do not seek to 
justify nor condone the abuses perpetuated by the state, but rather seek to operationalise its 
authoritarian coercion as a fundamentally strategic feature of its discourse of exclusionary 
politics. As Putnam noted, in domestic bargaining, “the group with the greatest interest in a 
particular issue is more likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue.”118
Many contemporary authors, like Phimister and Raftopoulous (2004), have sought to analyse 
state action in this period by construing it to be a simplistic contest between authoritarianism 
and human rights. A recurring argument is that ZANU PF has been able to “represent the 
fundamental human and civic rights questions placed on the Zimbabwean political agenda... 
as marginal, elite-focused issues driven by western interests and having little relation to 




 This remained a major area of contention 
between the internationalist groups, whose civil society trappings necessarily acknowledged 
universal prescriptions and standards of governance. In doing so they found alliances within 
the international community, particularly the US and Britain, and the need for regime change 
was portrayed as essential if democracy and stability was to be achieved. 
                                                            
117 Paris Yeros expanded on this point thus- “Zimbabwe is similar to other cases in South America, namely 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, which have also undergone similar socio-political convulsions in the last 
decade. These have all been driven mainly (save for Venezuela) by rural social movements with a radical 
nationalist agenda, aiming to recuperate natural resources, redistribute wealth, and reaffirm national 
sovereignty; and all have given way to “radicalised” states which have internalised the new radicalism. In these 
cases, we are dealing with a new (or revived) form of politics, which is certainly populist but also “anti-
systemic”. It is anti-systemic in that it has re-politicised economics, racial inequalities, regional asymmetries, 
and North-South relations, after a long period of neoliberal reforms. Moreover, it is a populism that is 
confrontational, challenging directly established forms of domestic representation and external diplomacy. In 
this sense, it is also a populism that is very different from the other populisms in Africa and South America, 
either of a right-wing or a centre-left variety.” 
 
~see Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. (forthcoming).  After Zimbabwe: State, Nation and Region in Africa, in S. Moyo, P. 
Yeros and J. Vadell (eds.), The National Question Today: The 
Crisis of Sovereignty in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Pp. 2 
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• Ideological divergence and sanctions 
 Not only was the domestic heterodox economic policy stance of the ZANU-PF government 
markedly different to the prerequisites of the IMF, but the ideological differences also played 
themselves out on the international sphere (Level 1). The fast track LRRP created a 
diplomatic impasse between government and Britain, and US respectively. With the former, 
it came in the context of the new Labour government under Tony Blair’s refusal to fund or to 
accept responsibility for the land reform, and crucially, its financial and diplomatic support 
for the MDC. Relations with the US reached their lowest point with the passing of the 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA)120
Interestingly, whilst the country was implementing IFI-led reforms in the early 1990s, there 
was no need to sanction its repression (against land occupiers and squatters on state and 
private farmland). However, with the suspension of the structural adjustment program and its 
implementation of the land reform into the 2000s, and its military intervention in the DRC, 
“all the economic and political conditionalities began to be invoked, beginning with the 
 in Congress. This Act 
essentially empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in 
multilateral lending agencies such as the IMF, (and including the World Bank, and the 
African Development Bank) to veto any applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit 
facilities, loan rescheduling, and international debt cancellation. The US cited Zimbabwe’s 
human rights record, political intolerance and absence of rule of law as the main reasons for 
the imposition of sanctions. The significance of these sanctions lay in the fact that although 
the US Congress passed it, it uses International Financial Institutions as the vehicles through 
which it carries out its mandate. This aspect of the IMF’s Level 2 highlights why their 
reasons for Zimbabwe’s suspension are at their core unconvincing. In other words, if the 
primary objective of the PRGF are to alleviate poverty and stimulate growth, and if the IMF 
is an apolitical institution, then it follows that a greater role could have been played in 
facilitating the land reform and factoring it into their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. It 
follows that if they had apolitically spearheaded and financed the post-land reform recovery, 
they have increased their win-set by ensuring that repayments of the arrears happened on 
their terms. 
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suspension of balance of payments support by the World Bank, and followed by a range of 
formal and informal sanctions.”121
 
  
  It remains significant therefore to detail how the US exercises its influence on the Fund, and 
to examine whether this influence was brought to bear on the negotiations between the IMF 
and Zimbabwe. On an abstract level, the primary ideological difference between the neo-
liberal IMF and radically nationalistic ZANU-PF government was the incompatibility of their 
key principles. While one prioritised openness, good governance and market liberalisation, 
the other preferred protectionism, authoritarianism and state control of the levers of the 
economy. On a practical level however, how did these ideological differences became 
manifest in relations between the Fund and the country? How were they rhetorically and 
institutionally translated? If IMF conditionalities vary depending on the political-economic 
structure and conditions in the borrowing country, does anything other than repayment 
arrears explain Zimbabwe’s suspension in 2001? 
Hawkins (2006) posited that a principal-agent relationship occurs between states and 
international organisations, as the former often delegates authority to independent agents like 
the IMF.122 What are the benefits of such delegation? The most significant benefit would be 
increased efficiency for the organisation. Once authority has been delegated however, 
problems may arise. In the literature, agency slack is the term used to describe independent 
action against the wishes of the principal. Shirking occurs when an agent puts in only 
minimal effort on its principal’s behalf. Slippage occurs when an agent shifts policy away 
from its principal’s preferred outcome and towards its own preferences123
                                                            
121 Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp. 184 
. Although it is the 
mandate of Executive Board of the Fund to ultimately ratify programs, it is inevitably its 
teams of professional economists who are the agents. They are responsible for negotiating 
with debtor countries and thus set the agenda that the Executive Board has to approve. A 
more difficult question however is who is (are) the principal(s)? The quota/weighted voting 
 
122 Hawkins, D.G. 2006. Delegation under Anarchy: States, Organisations and Principal-Agent Theory, in 
Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielsen, D and Tierney, M (Eds). Delegation and Agency in International Organisations. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp. 6 
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system invariably means that some members exercise more influence on the Fund than 
others124. The US ED is the most powerful director, controlling 16.79% of the Fund and 
giving them sole veto power.125 According to Woods (2003), a senior analyst in the Fund, 
they “virtually never present a recommendation which risks US disapproval’ - if it is a 
sensitive issue it is normally run by the US Treasury first.”126
 
 This leverage enjoyed by the 
US is a stark contrast to the vastly smaller influence wielded by Zimbabwe (even as a 
member of the G77 voting bloc). It thus served to strengthen the bargaining position of the 
IMF in that when payment defaults became an insufficient reason for suspension, then the 
ZIDERA act was evoked as binding and limited their space for compromise. Thus in the 
context of principal-agent relations, the leverage enjoyed by the principal (the US) ensured 
that the agent (IMF) could ill afford agency slack, shirking or slippage.  
• Level 2 players on both game boards: the internationalists vs. the nationalists 
An important characteristic of the government’s anti-imperialistic foreign policy rhetoric was 
regimes ability to locate it within the wider debate in international political economy 
concerning the ideological conflict between international norms and nationalist politics. In 
much the same way that classical imperialism generated a range of dependency theory and 
neo-colonial responses; contemporary economic globalisation and the increased 
“internationalisation of the state”127
                                                            
124 See- Rapkin, D and Strand, J. 2006. Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System, in World Economy. Vol. 
29, No. 3.  
 has seen a resurgence of nationalistic, localised social 
movement responses. In the literature, debates about nationalism and internationalism are 
often posed in simplistic ‘either-or’ terms. Critics of nationalism accuse nationalists of 
reliance on exclusivist or identity politics, whilst advocates of nationalism accuse 
 
125 Breen, M. 2008. The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. University 
College Dublin. Dublin. Online- http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAD/Resources/Breen.pdf. Accessed 19 
July 2009 
 
126 Woods, N. 2003. The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within 
the World Bank and the IMF, in US Hegemony and International Organizations. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford. Pp. 15 
 
127 See- Held, D. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. 
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internationalists of idealism and implicit imperialism.128 Practically however, nationalism is a 
profoundly international ideology, driven in part by international factors. Similarly, 
internationalism inescapably hinges on the national as much as international developments. 
However, the way in which one distinguishes itself from the other on a domestic political 
level is what is of interest to us. In the Zimbabwean case this nationalist fault-line debate also 
brought into question issues of nationality, rights, justice, exclusive race relations, and 
citizenship. The transnational alliances that the opposition and its neo-liberal civic movement 
roots forged, and the mobilisation by the ruling party against them, created tensions that 
played themselves out on the international arena- pitting developing countries in SADC 
(South Africa in particular) against the US and Europe on many forums.129
 
 
Neoliberal economic thought cannot be separated from its political underpinnings, of which 
the discourse of good governance and rule of law are most resonant. It is within this discourse 
that the internationalists became a meaningful opposition to the ruling party. On the 
government’s Level 2, two strategies were employed to limit the influence of the 
internationalists: the first an active exclusion from the political space, the second was its 
adoption of the nationalist-liberation movement discourse as the official position of the state. 
Its exclusion from political competition included, inter alia, using the police and war veterans 
to disrupt rallies and meetings held by the opposition. Through state controlled media, anti-
colonial propaganda, music, documentaries, and the glorification of the liberation struggle 
were propounded whilst at the same time independent newspapers and radio stations were 
shut down under the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The 
government’s actions ran counter to internationalist ideals (e.g. free speech etc.) and 
democratic state-society relations. The MDC and its allies (NGOs in particular) internally 
coordinated the resultant international pressure directed at the state. From the perspective of 
the IMF, these essentially political issues came to inform their rationale in negotiating with 
the country in that conflict between the opposition and the government came to be classified 
                                                            
128 Goodman, J. 2002. Nationalism and Globalism: Social Movement responses, in The International Scope 
Review. Vol. 20, No. 8 (Winter). Pp. 1 
 
129This was best illustrated by Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa’s summation to British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown regarding the controversy surrounding whether or not Mugabe should attend the 2007 EU-
Africa Summit in Lisbon: “if Zimbabwe is barred from the summit then the rest of Africa would boycott.”  
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as “impediments to economic growth and stability.”130 As Moyo and Yeros (2007) posit, 
when the reality of mass land occupations and radical nationalism clashed with their 
economistic blueprints, these internationalists closed ranks with reaction and sanctions.”131 
Under sanctions, the government resumed its nationalist fault-line defence by portraying the 
IMF and the MDC as agents of west, as seeking to undermine its sovereignty and sought to 
regain its legitimacy as ‘defenders of the revolution’132
Nationalist ideologies, as Anne McClintock (1993) has written, “are contested systems of 
representation enacted through social institutions, and legitimizing, or limiting people's 
access to the rights and resources of the nation-state.”
.  
133 As a group that opposed 
Zimbabwe’s radical nationalism, the internationalists, spearheaded by the MDC became 
natural allies to the United States, Britain and by proxy the IMF’s regime change policies. 
Their exclusion from ‘the rights and resources of the state’ thus prompted their calls for 
sanctions against the country.134
                                                            
130 IMF. 2001. IMF Country Report 01/13- Zimbabwe: Recent Economic Developments, Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix. (January 2001). Online- 
 These economic sanctions (ZIDERA in particular) added 
leverage to the IMF and limited the scope for meaningful engagement with the Zimbabwean 
government. By maintaining sanctions, calling for greater economic reforms and 
liberalisation on the Level 1 (international negotiation), whilst simultaneously allying 
themselves to the liberal forces in the country and supporting their human rights and rule of 
law agenda on the Level 2 (domestic), the IMF and its principal effectively reduced any win-
set overlap which may have existed. The removal of sanctions thus became an important 
factor in the negotiations as the nationalists viewed them as imperialist manoeuvres to 
pressurise the state. More significantly, the comprehensive sanctions undermined the land 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0113.pdf. 
Accessed 28 July 2009 
 
131 Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp 180 
 
132 ~See- Chirimambowa, T. 2008. Anti-Imperialism and Schizophrenic Revolutionaries in Zimbabwe, in 
Concerned Africa Scholars. Bulletin 80. (Winter 2008). Pp. 43 
 
133  Quoted in Lazarus, N. 1993. Disavowing Decolonisation: Fanon, Nationalism and the Problematic of 
Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse, in Research in African Literatures. Vol, 24. No. 4. Pp. 
70. 
 
134 SADOCC. 2004. Tsvangirai Warned not to call for further sanctions. Southern Africa Documentation and 












57 | P a g e  
 
reform programme by limiting credit lines from international and regional banks like the 
ADB, and restricted access to agricultural imports.135
 
  
This presented a significant example of the effect of domestic bargaining on foreign policy 
and negotiation. Whilst sanctions became the central policy of liberal imperialism 
internationally and the central strategy of the domestic opposition, the ZANU PF government 
diverted its strategic economic relations to the East to counter sanctions, and its radical 
nationalism remained unchanged. The extent of the ideological cleavage between the ruling 
party and opposition was reflected through Mugabe’s characterisation of the MDC in 2001: 
 
The MDC should never be judged by its black trade union face; by its youthful 
student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its 
rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper that these 
human superficies; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial 
yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return 
to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that 
converge on it; that drive and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is 
a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical 
forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.136
 
 
 Significantly, the ‘Look East’ policy that the government employed shifted the focus and 
trade away from the US and Britain, and saw China becoming the biggest foreign direct 
investor in the country by 2007. With its historic linkages to ZANU PF from the liberation 
struggle and its policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of its allies, China’s 
support of the government and the land reform were significant. Firstly, the government 
could afford to renege or ‘defect’ on tentative agreements with the IMF simply because it 
enjoyed a much larger win-set overlap with China137
                                                            
135 The shift away from the West and the IMF to China as the main foreign direct investor in the country 
significantly empowered the state to continue with the land reform. 
. Both countries saw radical nationalism 
as a key ideological tenet and had a mutually beneficial strategic alliance. Geo-politically 
China countered US and European dominance in the country, whilst Zimbabwe gained the 
 
136 Mugabe, 2001. Pp. 88. 
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financial support it could not get from the IMF. A hearing in the US House of 
Representatives adds credence to this point. It states, “while the International Monetary Fund 
is considering … a possible expulsion of Zimbabwe, and the South African Government has 
agreed to negotiate a bailout of the Zimbabwe economy under the condition that the 
Zimbabwe ruling party resumes cooperation talks with the MDC, and makes necessary 
democratic and governance reforms... Chinese influence is undoing the progress that has been 
made in Africa. The details of the Chinese... involve mineral and other trade concessions in 






Zimbabwe’s suspension from the IMF’s PRGF has been viewed and defended as resulting 
from the country’s inability to repay its outstanding loans. A deeper analysis through the lens 
of Putnam’s Two-Level games however reveals that there were a myriad of factors that 
contributed to the decision and that loan repayment arrears is too simplistic. The requisite 
prescriptions that the IMF use as their basis for extending credit are specifically couched in 
the discourse of good governance, human and property rights and respect for the rule of law. 
On a practical level the resulting contradiction between these conditionalities and the 
domestic priorities of the radicalised state proved them to be incompatible. In the context of 
the LRRP, the government could not afford to reverse its nationalist stance as a large measure 
of its legitimacy hinged upon indigenisation. On an ideological level, it stood in contrast to 
the domestic opposition, through whom its international allies sought regime change. 
Furthermore, the ideological divergence between the government and the MDC; and the 
government and the IMF was clearly highlighted by the imposition of sanctions. Once it 
became clear that Zimbabwe was pursuing an alternative road to development and economic 
redistribution that fell outside of the prescriptions of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, the 
most influential members of the Fund (the US and European Union) exercised their leverage 
through comprehensive sanctions measures. In effect, negotiations were bound to fail and 
because the IMF purports to be an apolitical multilateral institution, the claim that suspension 
was simply a matter of repayment became the only gambit available in its defence. The 
                                                            
138 US Government, 2005. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Human Global Rights and International 
Operations, of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. 109th Congress 1st Session. 
Washington. Serial Number 109-74. Online- http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/22658.pdf 
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internal bargaining between the two ideological camps also increased the likelihood of the 
government’s (both voluntary and involuntary) defection on the international negotiation. 
Aligned to its nationalist rhetoric, the state portrayed the opposition and those against the 
LRRP as imperialist proxies. In doing so, it defended the land reform; justified its 
radicalisation, and significantly ‘Looked East’ for financial and ideological support. The 
different win-set sizes of the IMF and of the government on these issues is why the 
negotiations failed. Secondly, the size of the domestic win-set in Zimbabwe affected the 
opposing constituents in different ways. The opposition was effectively excluded from 
domestic political space and from negotiations with the IMF and so had to look to NGOs and 
external Western support; whilst China paid the cost-of-no-agreement for the government by 
increasing aid, economic links and trade. Finally, side-payments played a significant part in 
maintaining the political status quo, through the co-optation of the military and security 
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CHAPTER 4- Concluding Findings 
 
Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 2000 and 2007 reveals the significance of domestic 
politics on its content and substance. Three features that became the cornerstone of its foreign 
relations were land reform justification, radical nationalism and sovereignty. Although both 
internal and external considerations are important in foreign policy making, its relations with 
the IMF showed how domestic political considerations played a significantly larger role. Its 
domestic policy also reflected the national socio-political and economic structures, which 
underlie the relationship between the antagonistic social forces that constituted the country’s 
socio-economic system. The country’s foreign policy towards the Fund has largely been 
portrayed as being ‘irrationally’ antagonistic and its eventual suspension in 2001 is often 
explained as resulting solely from its inability to repay its loans, specifically regarding the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Analyses into the justification of the IMF’s 
position have largely construed the political effects of the LRRP and the resultant heterodox 
economic policies as the main reason for these repayment arrears. 
 Over and above the economic counters, neoliberal political discourses of good governance, 
property rights and rule of law have dominated the literature, of which in this case most have 
been lacking in analytical usefulness. By separating these neoliberal aspects of democratic 
theory from Zimbabwe’s socio-historical context, and applying them without rigorously 
inquiring into the nature of the domestic socio-political bargaining and ideological cleavages 
created by the LRRP, a gap is revealed in the literature. Firstly, Zimbabwe was a neo-
colonial, radicalised state, one in which the ‘good governance’ prescriptions of property 
rights etc. necessarily had to be suspended in order for a correspondingly radical 
redistribution of land to occur and the polarised income inequality to be addressed. The 
state’s radicalisation was further exacerbated by the resultant socio-economic cleavages and 
contradictions, which inevitably spilt onto the political arena. 
What has largely been neglected in these analyses of the country’s foreign policy in the 2000s 
has been the nature of this radicalisation and impact of the fast track LRRP in creating 
cleavages in the country that affected its international relations. Whilst Zimbabwe’s foreign 
policy has been carried out by the state, the formulation of those policies has not exclusively 
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provisions on land and structural adjustment on constituents across class divides solidified 
opposition to the state- in both ideological and practical ways. On a domestic level, these 
cleavages became manifest in the resultant political competition (between those subscribing 
to and perpetuating neo-liberal political and economic ideals, and those defensively 
propounding a radical nationalism in resistance to those ideals) over the control of the state 
and the definition of the rules of the political game. On the international plane, this 
ideological divergence was characterised by  antagonistic rhetorical exchanges and relations 
with predominantly western powers, whom the government accused of imperialist motives 
and creating a regime change agenda that would undermine the principle of sovereignty. In 
essence, domestic pressures from below (in the form of the opposition) and foreign pressures 
from above (in the form of sanctions and suspension from the PRGF) over the LRRP served 
to forge an anti-imperialist, vehemently nationalist, radicalised state. Because of the 
uniqueness and magnitude of the land reform, and the structural convulsions that resulted 
from it, analysis into the domestic determinants of its foreign policy cannot be understood 
through the lens of a bourgeoisie democracy. Putnam’s Two-Level games model provides the 
best framework through which we can get to the core of our foreign policy analysis. This 
dissertation identified the actors on the different levels, and analysed the context and 
outcomes of the bargaining between them. 
 
 The country’s relations with the IMF regarding the PRGF suspension became an arena in 
which the conflict between the internationalists and the nationalists played itself out. Firstly, 
the contradiction between external conditionality and domestic political considerations 
created an incompatibility of win-sets. Secondly, the imposition of ZIDERA by the US 
leveraged its position in the IMF, effectively blocking any manoeuvring space that it may 
have had in its negotiations with Zimbabwe. Thirdly, Zimbabwe’s Level 2 bargaining, 
between opposition MDC and the ruling party, and the practicalities surrounding the LRRP 
became more of priority for the government than the Level 1 game. This was exacerbated by 
the ‘Look East’ economic policy that the state undertook. From a purely pragmatic view, 
although the cost-of-no-agreement with the Fund was high, the ‘cost of agreement’ would 
have been higher for the ZANU PF government. Acceding to conditionalities and reversing 
(or attempting to reverse) the LRRP would in effect have de-legitimised the government, 
particularly in the face of comprehensive sanctions, and regime change would have 
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was therefore essential for the country to continue with its land reform. This support also 
largely reduced the effect of international economic sanctions and countered some of the 
leverage that the IMF enjoyed. Any meaningful understanding of foreign policy is thus 
contingent on a comprehensive sensitivity to the bargaining of different domestic actors and 
on the external influences of those bargains. This remains particularly relevant when one is 
































• Adar, K and Ajulu, R. 2002. Southern African States’ Foreign Policy and Foreign 
Policy making Process: An Introductory Contextualisation, in Adar, K and Ajulu, R 
(Eds.) Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making 
Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa. Ashgate Publishing. Rhodes 
University. 
 




• Akokpari, J and Nyoni, T. 2009. Reassessing the Politics of Neo-colonialism and 
African Solidarity: Contextualizing Thabo Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe, in 
Afrikka: Journal of Politics, Economics and Society. Volume 1, March Issue. 
 
• Allison, G. 1977. The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Little, Brown and Company. Boston.  
• Bird, G. 2001. A Suitable Case for Treatment? The Ongoing Debate about the IMF, in 
Third World Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 5.  
 
• Bracking, S. 1999. Structural Adjustment: Why it wasn’t necessary and why it didn’t 
work, in Review of African Political Economy.  Vol. 26, No. 80. (Bringing 
Imperialism Back In.) June 1999.  
 
• Breen, M. 2008. The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality. Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation. University College Dublin. Dublin. Online- 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAD/Resources/Breen.pdf. 
 
• Chirimambowa, T. 2008. Anti-Imperialism and Schizophrenic Revolutionaries in 
Zimbabwe, in Concerned Africa Scholars. Bulletin 80. (Winter 2008). 
 
• Clapham, C. 1977. Sub-Saharan Africa, in Foreign Policy Making in Developing 
Countries. Christopher Clapham (Ed). Saxon House. Farnborough.  
 
• Dansereau, S. 2003. Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe, in Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 21, No. 2. (May 2003).  
 
• Diaz, C; Zamora, J and Dominguez, A. 2008. The Role of the IMF in Recent 
Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Implications for the Policy of Lending into Arrears. 













64 | P a g e  
 
 
• Gibbon, P. 1996. Zimbabwe, in Engberg-Pederson, P. Gibbon, P. Raikes, P and 
Udsholt, L (eds.), Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic 
Liberalisation 1986-1994. Copenhagen and Oxford. Centre for Development Research 
in Association with James Currey.  
 
• Haas, E. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces. 
University of Notre Dame Press.  
• Held, D. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
 
• Hellelner, G. 1983. The IMF and Africa in the 1980s. Princeton University Press. 
Princeton.  
 
• Herbst, J. 1990. The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa, in World 
Development. Vol. 18, No. 7.  
 
• Holsti, K.J. 1995. International Politics: A Framework of Analysis. 7th Ed. Prentice 
Hall. Engelwood Cliff.  
 
• Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the 
Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis.  
 
• Huyse, L. 2003. Zimbabwe: Why Reconciliation Failed, in Bloomfield,D. Barnes, T 
and Huyse, L.( eds.) 2003.  Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Stockholm.  
 
• IMF Press Release. IMF adopts declaration of Non-cooperation for Zimbabwe and 
Suspends Technical Assistance.[Online] 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0228.htm  
• IMF. 2001. Press Release 01/40- IMF Declares Zimbabwe Ineligible to Use IMF 
Resources. Online- http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2001/pr0140.htm  
 
• IMF. 2001. IMF Country Report 01/13- Zimbabwe: Recent Economic Developments, 
Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. (January 2001). Online- 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0113.pdf. 
 














65 | P a g e  
 




• International Crisis Group. 2002. All Bark, No Bite- The International response to 
Zimbabwe’s Crisis. Africa Report. No. 40.  
 
• Jah, R and Saggar, M. 2001. The Determinants of Sovereign Borrowing from the IMF, 
in Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 36, No. 36.  
 
• Jenkins, C. 1997. The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe, in Journal of 
Modern African Studies. Vol. 35, No. 4.  
 
• Kahler, M. 1993. Bargaining with the IMF: Two-Level Strategies and Developing 
Countries, in Evans, P. Jacobson, H and Putnam, R (eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. 
Berkeley.  
 
• Kennan, G. 1946.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942-1952/54. Washington 
DC. US GPO. (1961-1979.)  
 
• Keohane, R and Nye, J. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Little, Brown and Company. Boston.  
• Khadiagala, G and Lyons, T. 2001. Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An 
Introduction. In Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (Eds.) African Foreign 
Policies: Power and Process. Boulder. Lynne.  
 
• Lazarus, N. 1993. Disavowing Decolonisation: Fanon, Nationalism and the 
Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse, in 
Research in African Literatures. Vol, 24. No. 4. 
 
• Matondi, P. 2008. Shaping and Stewarding Replacement amidst Uncertainty of fast 
track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Paper. 
• Mayer, F.1992. Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The 
Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments, in International Organization. Volume 46, 
No. 4. (Autumn 1992) 
 
• Mabasa, S. 2007. New African. Winter 2007/2008, No. 462. 
 
• McGreal, C. 2002. The trail from Lancaster House, Guardian, 16 January. 
 
• Mlambo, A. 1993. Towards an Analysis of the Role and Impact of IMF Structural 












66 | P a g e  
 
• Moore, W and Scarritt, J. 1990. IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black 
Africa: An Exploratory Analysis, in Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 4, The Human 
Condition and Structural Adjustment in Africa (4th Qtr. 1990) 
 
• Moyo, S. 2000. The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in 
Zimbabwe 1990-1999. Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1.  
 
• Moyo, S. 2004. The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the 
conference on ‘Agrarian Constraint and Poverty Reduction: Macroeconomic lessons 
for Africa’, Addis Ababa. 17-18 December 2004. 
 
• Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2007. The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe’s Interrupted 
Revolution, in Review of African Political Economy. No. 34. 
 
• Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2007. The Zimbabwean Question and the Two Lefts, in 
Historical Materialism. Volume 15.  
• Mugabe, R. 2001. Inside the Third Chimurenga. Government of Zimbabwe Press. 
Harare.  
 
• Muzondidya, J. 2009. From Buoyancy to Crisis: 1980-1997, in Raftopoulos, B and 
Mlambo, A (Eds.) 2009. Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from The Pre-colonial 
Period to 2008. Weaver Press. Harare.  
 
• Muzorewa, G. 2009. Chimurenga Armed Struggles, in The International 
Encyclopaedia of Revolutions and Protest. Immanuel Ness (Ed.) Blackwell 




• Ncube, W. and Nzombe, S. 1991. Continuity and Change in the Constitutional 
Development of Zimbabwe, in Preben Kaarsholm (ed.) Cultural Struggle and 
Development in Southern Africa. Baobab Printers. Harare. 
 
• Nelson, S and Wallace, G. 2005. Conditional Credibility: Explaining the Impact of 
the IMF on Democratisation. Cornell University. New York. Paper Presented for the 
2005 American Political Science Association meeting, September 1-5, Washington 
DC. 
 
• Nest, M. 2001. Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, in African Affairs. Volume 100. 
• Palmer, R. 1990. Land Reform in Zimbabwe: 1980-1990, in African Affairs, Vol. 89, 
No. 355.  
 
• Raftopoulous, B. 2009. The Crisis in Zimbabwe, in Becoming Zimbabwe: A historic 
from the Pre-Colonial Period to 1998. Mlambo, A and Raftopolous, B (eds.) Institute 











67 | P a g e  
 
 
• Rapkin, D and Strand, J. 2006. Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System, in 
World Economy. Vol. 29, No. 3.  
 
• Richardson, C. 2006. Learning from Failure: Property Rights, Land Reforms and the 
Hidden Architecture of Capitalism. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research. Volume 2. 
• Rienner. Youdem J. 2007. Why Look East? Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy and China, in 
Africa Today. Vol. 53. No. 3 (Spring). 
 
• Rotberg, R. 2000. Africa’s Mess, Mugabe’s Mayhem, in Foreign Affairs. Vol. 79, No. 
5.  
 
• Sachikonye, L. 2003. From ‘Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast Track’ Reform: 
Zimbabwe’s Land Question, in Review of African Political Economy. Volume 30, 
No. 6. (War and the Forgotten Continent) June 2003.  
• SADC. 1996. Communiqué from the 1996 Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit to Launch 
the SADC Organ. Online- http://www.sadc.int/archives/read/news/231  
 
• SADOCC. 2004. Tsvangirai Warned not to call for further sanctions. Southern Africa 
Documentation and Cooperation Centre. Online- http://www.sadocc.at/news/2004-
372.shtml. Accessed 16 April 2009 
 
• Sibanda, A.1991. The Lancaster House Agreement and the Post-Independence State 
in Zimbabwe. Discussion Papers, Paper No.9, Zimbabwe Institute for Development 
Studies, Harare.  
 
• Skalnes, T. 1989. Group Interests and the State: An Explanation of Zimbabwe’s 
Agricultural Policies, in Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 1.  
 
• Stavridis, S. and Hill, C. 1996. The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West 
European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict. Berg Publishers. Oxford.  
 
• Stephan, H. Power, M. Hervey, A and Fonseca, R. 2006. The Scramble for Africa in 
the 21st century: A view from the South. Renaissance Press. Cape Town.  
• Stoneman, C. 1991. The World Bank Demands its Pound of Zimbabwe Flesh, in 
Review of African Political Economy. No. 53 
 
• Stoneman, C. 1993. The World Bank: Some lessons for South Africa, in Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 58.  
 
• Taylor, S. 1999. Business and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Agricultural 















• Thomas, N. 2003. Land Reform in Zimbabwe, in Third World Quarterly. Volume 24, 
No. 4.  
 
• US Government, 2005. China’s Influence in Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Africa, Human Global Rights and International Operations, of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives. 109th Congress 1st Session. 
Washington. Serial Number 109-74. Online- 
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/22658.pdf 
• Woods, N. 2003. The United States and the International Financial Institutions: 
Power and Influence within the World Bank and the IMF, in US Hegemony and 
International Organizations. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
 
• Xinhua News Agency. 2004. Zimbabwe, China Sign Agreement to Strengthen Trade 
Relations.Online- [http://china.org.cn/english/international/88067.htm]  
• Zimbabwe. 2003. Report of the Presidential Land review Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Dr Charles Utete. Harare. Government Printers.  August 2003.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
